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[The decision of the High Court in the Work Choices Case presents a paradox. It is possible on one 
hand to read it as a revolutionary decision which has up-ended our conventional understanding of 
the scope and nature of the Commonwealth’s power over industrial relations, with significant 
long-term implications for the balance of power between Commonwealth and state governments. On 
the other hand, it is possible to read the outcome as entirely predictable in terms of established 
principles and methods of constitutional interpretation, themselves the culmination of a long line of 
cases dealing with federal legislative power generally and the corporations power in particular. 
In this article, it is contended that the paradoxical nature of the Work Choices Case is best 
understood by reference to a series of interpretive choices that have been made by the High Court 
over the course of its history and which are recapitulated in the joint judgment. Reading the case in 
this way, it is argued, enables us to understand both the significance of the outcome and the 
predictability of the reasoning. It also helps us to understand the conundrum faced by the dissenting 
justices, who wished to resist a decision that would radically overhaul the balance of power between 
the Commonwealth and the states. Such resistance required the repudiation of a series of established 
conventions of constitutional interpretation, as well as entailing a return to the idea that in 
determining the scope of Commonwealth powers it is both legitimate and desirable to take into 
consideration the scope of power retained by the states. This latter aspect, however, presents us with 
the question: what exactly is wrong with the reserved powers doctrine? It is argued that, when the 
doctrine is understood and applied in its most sophisticated, interpretive form, the answer is: not 
much at all.] 
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GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Solicitor for New South Wales. 
MR SEXTON: If the Court pleases. This is a case about the division of legisla-
tive power under the Constitution between the Commonwealth Parliament and 
the Parliament of the States. It raises the question … 
KIRBY J: Is that quite right? Is it not about the extent of the power of the Fed-
eral Parliament? 
MR SEXTON: Combined with section 109, your Honour, it is a question about 
division, we would say. 
KIRBY J: It sounds to have the ghosts of the reserve powers clanking … 
MR SEXTON: No, there is no suggestion of that, your Honour.1 
… 
KIRBY J: You are not trying under the guise of this history to revive the re-
serve powers notion, are you? 
MR SOFRONOFF: Absolutely not, your Honour. Absolutely not. 
HAYNE J: Wash your mouth out with soap. 
KIRBY J: I am just looking a bit suspiciously at you.2 
I   INTRODUCTION 
In New South Wales v Commonwealth3 — the well-known ‘Work Choices 
Case’ — a 5:2 majority of the High Court of Australia upheld the Workplace 
Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) (‘Work Choices Act’)4 as 
validly enacted under the Commonwealth’s corporations power.5 This Act 
effected a far-reaching transformation of Australian industrial relations law, 
displacing the existing federal system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration 
based on the industrial arbitration power6 and excluding the operation of a range 
of state and territory workplace regimes. 
The case presents a paradox. On one hand, it is possible to read it as a revolu-
tionary decision which has up-ended our conventional understanding of the 
 
 1 New South Wales v Commonwealth [2006] HCATrans 215 (Gleeson CJ, M G Sexton SC and 
Kirby J, 4 May 2006). 
 2 New South Wales v Commonwealth [2006] HCATrans 217 (Kirby J, W Sofronoff QC and 
Hayne J, 8 May 2006). 
 3 (2006) 229 CLR 1 (‘Work Choices Case’). 
 4 The Work Choices Act amended the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘Workplace Relations 
Act’). 
 5 The corporations power is contained in s 51(xx) of the Constitution: 
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, or-
der, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to … foreign corporations, and 
trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth. 
 6 The industrial arbitration power is contained in s 51(xxxv) of the Constitution: 
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, or-
der, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to … conciliation and arbitra-
tion for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any 
one State. 
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extent of the Commonwealth’s power over industrial relations and corporations, 
with far-reaching implications for the balance of power between the Common-
wealth and the states. Describing the decision as ‘a shipwreck of Titanic propor-
tions’, Greg Craven has stated that ‘[n]ot since the 1920’s [sic] has the Court 
struck such a devastating blow against Australian federalism.’7 Focusing upon its 
implications for the regulation of workplace relations, Ron McCallum similarly 
described the case as the most significant change in the ‘constitutional contours’ 
of federal–state relations delivered since 1920.8 On the other hand, it is also 
possible to read the decision as the entirely predictable application of long 
established methods of interpreting federal legislative power. As George Wil-
liams has remarked, in spite of the ‘extraordinary policy and political conse-
quences’ of the outcome,9 the Work Choices Case was ‘a very orthodox decision’ 
which came as no surprise to informed commentators.10 
Thus, there are two very different assessments of the significance of the case. 
How is it best understood? Is the decision revolutionary? Is it entirely conven-
tional? Or is it somehow both? 
In this article, I argue that the decision is best understood — that its paradoxi-
cal character is best explained — by reference to a series of interpretive choices 
that have been made by the High Court over the course of its history and which 
are recapitulated in the Work Choices Case. These choices are of utmost signifi-
cance — they are indeed revolutionary — when critically assessed in light of the 
text, structure and underlying principles and purposes of the Constitution. And 
yet, they are well-established choices that have become the conventional 
 
 7 ABC Radio National, ‘Work Choices Shipwreck’, Perspective, 6 December 2006 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/perspective/stories/2006/1803817.htm>. Craven continued: ‘How a 
Court can weigh every tiny word of a Constitution without grasping the central premise that it 
was meant to create a genuine federation must baffle historians and psychoanalysts alike.’ As 
Craven elsewhere put it, ‘at the stroke of a pen’ the High Court has made ‘one of the greatest 
unauthorised amendments to the Constitution in its entire history’: Greg Craven, ‘How the High 
Court Failed Us’, Australian Financial Review (Melbourne), 24 November 2006, 82. For a 
measured criticism, see Simon Evans et al, Work Choices: The High Court Challenge (2007)  
19–21. 
 8 Ron McCallum, ‘The Work Choices Case: Some Reflections’ (2007) 19 Judicial Officers’ 
Bulletin 29, 29. Professor McCallum argues that the Work Choices Act entirely revolutionised 
the federal regulation of workplace relations in Australia, transforming the field from one struc-
tured under a system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration to one in which industrial rela-
tions are conceptualised and regulated as a particular aspect of the law relating to trading corpo-
rations. Not all pro-market commentators wholeheartedly support the Work Choices’ combina-
tion of constitutional centralism and economic liberalism. For example, the president of the H R 
Nicholls Society, Ray Evans, stated that his organisation would favour the Commonwealth 
withdrawing entirely from the field and allowing the states to compete with one another in 
providing labour market regulation: see Ray Evans, Letter to the Editor, Australian Financial 
Review (Melbourne), 1 August 2005, 59. 
 9 ABC Radio National, ‘The Workchoices Case’, The Law Report, 21 November 2006 
<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lawreport/stories/2006/1791213.htm>. In this program, Williams 
describes the Work Choices Case as a ‘landmark’ decision principally because it affirms that the 
Commonwealth can use the corporations power to regulate just about any field in which 
s 51(xx) corporations operate in our world today. In other words, the case opens up the potential 
for the Commonwealth to enter a number of diverse fields such as education, hospitals, town 
planning, water management, uranium mining and many others besides — essentially any area 
in which services are provided or goods and materials exchanged, so long as a trading or finan-
cial corporation is somehow involved. 
 10 Ibid. See also George Williams, ‘Goodbye to States’ Rights’, The Age (Melbourne), 15 
November 2006, 17. 
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rudiments of the High Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. To get to the heart of 
the Work Choices Case, therefore, it is necessary to recount these choices, to 
show what they are and why they are significant, and to show how they are 
fundamental to the Court’s reasoning. Moreover, because they are choices, it is 
also necessary to show how the course of Australian constitutional interpretation 
might have been different by explaining the forks in the road and indicating the 
alternative paths that might have been taken. 
At a pivotal point in its history, the High Court deliberately chose between two 
fundamentally different approaches to the interpretation of the legislative powers 
of the Commonwealth and the states. The first approach was one commonly 
known as the ‘reserved powers doctrine’ and associated with the judgments of 
the Court under its first Chief Justice, Sir Samuel Griffith. The other is generally 
associated with the Court’s famous decision in Amalgamated Society of Engi-
neers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (‘Engineers’ Case’), delivered under the 
intellectual leadership of Sir Isaac Isaacs.11 In the fateful Engineers’ Case, the 
Court anathematised the conceptual foundations of the reserved powers doctrine 
and substituted an alternative approach that has become the Court’s conventional 
stance ever since. 
In this article, I argue that the reserved powers and Engineers’ doctrines cannot 
properly be understood or evaluated without first unscrambling the two doctrines 
into their constituent elements and then identifying the different versions in 
which each doctrine has been presented. As to this second task, I contend that 
three versions of both doctrines are to be distinguished. These I label respec-
tively, and for reasons that will become apparent, the abridged, absolute and 
interpretive versions of the reserved powers doctrine and the abridged, testamen-
tary and methodological versions of the Engineers’ doctrine. Moreover, because 
the reserved powers doctrine has long been regarded as heresy, its influence in 
constitutional interpretation has been camouflaged: only particular elements of 
the doctrine have been (at times) utilised in various configurations, including the 
idea of ‘federal balance’, a concept which has also been advanced in abridged, 
absolute and interpretive forms. 
When the various elements and different versions of the reserved powers, 
federal balance and Engineers’ doctrines are clearly distinguished, it becomes 
possible to identify their respective roles in the many cases in which the High 
Court has interpreted the scope of the Commonwealth’s legislative powers. 
Analysing the Work Choices Case in these terms enables us not only to under-
stand the paradoxical character of the decision, but also to expose the underlying 
constitutional jurisprudence to critical analysis. When the Work Choices Case is 
understood as presenting a series of interpretive choices, the apparent inevitabil-
ity of the outcome, as presented by the majority of the Court, begins to dissolve 
before our eyes. Furthermore, when we understand the issues presented by the 
case as involving elements of reserved powers reasoning, it becomes easier to 
comprehend the conundrum in which the plaintiffs and the two dissenting 
justices, Kirby and Callinan JJ, found themselves. This dilemma was one of 
wishing to resist an outcome that would radically overhaul the balance of power 
 
 11 (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
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between the Commonwealth and the states, but where the only truly effective 
path of resistance involved repudiating a whole line of established conventions 
of constitutional interpretation. The crucial strategic question was whether to 
challenge those conventions head-on through an openly acknowledged resuscita-
tion of the reserved powers doctrine, or whether to try and show that the Work 
Choices Act could not be supported by the corporations power when that power 
was read according to orthodox methods of interpretation. Such was the techni-
cal cleverness of the legislation, however, that a conventional attack was 
unlikely to succeed, and so a radical path beckoned. And yet, constitutional law 
remains a highly traditional and conservative discipline — in what other body of 
Australian law are labels such as ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heresy’ so commonly and 
forcefully used?12 Thus, the path proposed by the dissenters had to be couched in 
conventional terms. 
In the majority’s joint judgment in the Work Choices Case, the plaintiffs’ 
arguments were rejected on the basis of a caricature of the reserved powers and 
federal balance doctrines which presented them almost entirely in their absolute 
forms, without ever seriously addressing the much more sophisticated and 
persuasive interpretive versions of both doctrines. While there are indeed 
problems with the absolute versions of these doctrines, I argue that the more 
subtle interpretive versions avoid these problems and, indeed, chart an approach 
to the interpretation of federal legislative powers much more in line with the text, 
structure, underlying principles and overarching purposes of the Constitution.13 
The article proceeds as follows. Part II summarises the legislation, issues and 
arguments in the Work Choices Case. Part III deals with the reserved powers 
doctrine. It explains the way in which the doctrine was formulated by the Griffith 
Court and it identifies three different versions in which the doctrine has at times 
been presented. In so doing, Part III also touches upon the subversive path that 
the reserved powers doctrine had to take after the Engineers’ Case, noting in 
particular the part played by the notion of federal balance. Part IV discusses the 
Engineers’ doctrine — particularly spelling out its abridged, testamentary and 
methodological dimensions — and explaining its influence upon the interpreta-
tion of federal legislative power in the decided cases. Part V then seeks to show 
how Engineers’ orthodoxy was fundamental to the majority’s joint judgment in 
the Work Choices Case, as well as how various aspects and elements of reserved 
powers and federal balance reasoning were utilised in the case’s dissenting 
judgments. Finally, Part VI concludes by asking: what exactly is wrong with the 
reserved powers doctrine? Not quite as much as is often thought, it is concluded. 
 
 12 See, eg, A-G (Vic) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529, 582 (Windeyer J); Victo-
ria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 396 (Windeyer J) (‘Payroll Tax Case’); R v Lambert; 
Ex parte Plummer (1980) 146 CLR 447, 470 (Murphy J); Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 
158 CLR 1, 147–8 (Mason J) (‘Tasmanian Dam Case’); Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, 
427 (McHugh J); Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 589 (McHugh J). 
 13 In so arguing, I harbour no illusions about the likelihood of my contentions having much of an 
impact on the Court as it is currently constituted. The reserved powers doctrine has long been 
anathematised as heresy, and even the federal balance theory seems now to have been placed 
under interdiction. Moreover, all the indications are that they are not about to be readmitted to 
full communion. 
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II   WORK CHOICES 
The Work Choices Act effected a far-reaching transformation of Australian 
workplace relations law.14 Among other things, it encouraged an expanded role 
for Australian Workplace Agreements in substitution for Industrial Relations 
Commission awards, it reduced the number of mandatory employee entitlements, 
and it established the Australian Fair Pay Commission, which was made respon-
sible for setting and adjusting statutory minimum wage levels. The Work Choices 
Act also provided that it is to apply to the exclusion of a range of state and 
territory workplace laws.15 Previously, the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) 
(‘Workplace Relations Act’) had principally rested upon the industrial arbitration 
power and only marginally upon the corporations and external affairs powers.16 
However, the primary constitutional foundation for the amendments introduced 
by the Work Choices Act was, and remains, the corporations power.17 
This connection to the corporations power is achieved through the definitions 
sections of the Workplace Relations Act, as substantially amended by the Work 
Choices Act. As a result of the amendments, s 5(1) of the Workplace Relations 
Act now defines an ‘employee’ as an individual insofar as they are employed, or 
usually employed, by an employer as defined in s 6(1). Section 6(1) in turn 
defines an ‘employer’ as, inter alia, ‘a constitutional corporation, so far as it 
employs, or usually employs, an individual’. Section 4 defines ‘constitutional 
corporation’ as a corporation to which s 51(xx) of the Constitution applies. The 
substantive provisions of the Workplace Relations Act then confer and impose a 
range of powers, rights and duties upon the employees and employers thus 
defined. In this way, the basic objective of the amendments to the Workplace 
 
 14 Note that since the judgment in the Work Choices Case was handed down, the newly elected 
Labor Government — under the leadership of Kevin Rudd — introduced its Workplace Rela-
tions Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Bill 2008 (Cth) on 13 February 2008 as 
part of fulfilling its election mandate to abolish the current Work Choices scheme. It was passed 
by the federal Parliament on 19 March 2008, received royal assent on 20 March 2008 and will 
come into force six months from this date — see Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to 
Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 (Cth) s 2. Under the Act, existing Australian Workplace 
Agreements will continue to operate until their expiration or termination. This effectively pro-
poses a complete phase out by 2013: Samantha Maiden, Libs Move Signals Fresh AWA Signup 
(2008) The Australian <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,,23174805-2702,0 
0.html>. See also Australian Government, Transition to Forward with Fairness Bill Passes the 
Australian Parliament (19 March 2008) Australian Workplace <http://www.workplace.gov 
.au/workplace/Publications/News/TransitiontoForwardwithFairnessBill2008passestheAustralian 
Parliament.htm>. 
 15 For an analysis, see Joellen Riley and Kathryn Peterson, Work Choices: A Guide to the 2005 
Changes (2006). 
 16 Section 51(xxix) of the Constitution provides: 
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, or-
der, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to … external affairs. 
  In Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 (‘Industrial Relations Act Case’), Victoria, 
Western Australia and South Australia had challenged a substantial number of the provisions of 
the Workplace Relations Act. However, they had conceded that s 51(xx) empowered the Com-
monwealth to make laws concerning the workplace affairs of constitutional corporations: at 540 
(Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
 17 See Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 68–74 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ). However, the Commonwealth also invoked the industrial arbitration and territories 
powers to support particular aspects of the legislation: at 74. 
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Relations Act was to introduce a national workplace relations system which 
applies to the majority of employees throughout Australia. 
Several actions were commenced by five Australian states18 and a number of 
trade union organisations challenging the validity of the Work Choices Act, 
principally on the ground that the corporations power did not support an entire 
industrial relations regime of this kind. A number of interrelated lines of argu-
ment were available.19 
First, it was generally acknowledged that the case raised questions about the 
scope of the corporations power that had not specifically arisen in previous 
decisions,20 and so submissions were made concerning the meaning and reach of 
the decided cases. Argument in this respect particularly concerned the problem 
of identifying the proper scope of the corporations power. Specifically, it was 
submitted by the plaintiffs that the power under s 51(xx) of the Constitution 
extends only to the ‘external’ relationships of constitutional corporations and not 
to ‘internal’ matters, such as the relationship between a corporation and its 
employees. The plaintiffs pointed out that the corporations power assumes that 
the corporations to which it applies already exist and engage in certain kinds of 
activities,21 with the relationship between a corporation and its officers and 
employees being a matter essentially incidental to the formation of corporations, 
and thus outside the scope of s 51(xx). It was alternatively submitted that, if a 
general test was required, the nature of the corporation must be a significant 
element in the nature or character of the law, and that the corporations power is 
therefore directed to the regulation of characteristics which distinguish corpora-
tions from other legal persons, or the regulation of their interaction with the 
public in relation to those characteristics (an approach which came to be called 
the ‘distinctive character’ test).22 This entailed a rejection of the view that the 
corporations power extends to any law in which constitutional corporations are 
an object of command (the ‘object of command’ test).23 While the argument was 
based primarily on the language of s 51(xx) and secondarily on the case law, it 
was also submitted that the framers of the Constitution and early text writers saw 
 
 18 New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia. The Attor-
neys-General of Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory also 
intervened in support of the plaintiffs. 
 19 I rely here on the summary of argument prepared by Chris Horan, ‘Summary of Counsels’ 
Arguments’ in Simon Evans et al, Work Choices: The High Court Challenge (2007) 99. See also 
the summary in the majority’s joint judgment: Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 74–7 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) and the record of argument: at 8–54. 
 20 See Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 102 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ). 
 21 Section 51(xx) of the Constitution refers to corporations ‘formed’, and it was held in New South 
Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482 (‘Incorporation Case’) that the power does not 
therefore extend to the incorporation of companies. 
 22 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 16 (argument of Pamela Tate SC, Solicitor-General of 
Victoria). Cases cited on this point included Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Aus-
tralia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169, 182–3 (Gibbs CJ), 215 (Wilson J) 
(‘Fontana Films’); Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323, 337 (Brennan J), 349 
(Dawson J) (‘Re Dingjan’). 
 23 This was proposed in Fontana Films (1982) 150 CLR 169, 212 (Murphy J); Tasmanian Dam 
Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 179 (Murphy J); Re Dingjan (1995) 183 CLR 323, 334 (Mason CJ), 
364–5 (Gaudron J), 368–9 (McHugh J); Re Pacific Coal Pty Ltd; Ex parte Construction, For-
estry, Mining and Energy Union (2000) 203 CLR 346, 375 (Gaudron J) (‘Re Pacific Coal’). 
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the objective of the power as enabling provision to be made in relation to the 
status and recognition of corporations. This later developed, it was submitted, 
into a concern to enable regulation of the particular characteristics of corpora-
tions qua corporations, and their interaction with the public, such as by defining 
conditions under which companies may carry on business throughout the 
Commonwealth.24 
Secondly, wider arguments were made concerning the Constitution’s underly-
ing federal structures, principles and purposes. The object of command test 
would, it was said, enable the Commonwealth to legislate on a whole range of 
subjects, such as employment, defamation, negligence, contracts, succession, 
trusts and crime, provided that one of the persons involved was a constitutional 
corporation. However, it was submitted that the corporations power needs to be 
interpreted in the context of the Constitution as a whole, which includes the 
conferral of specifically defined heads of legislative power upon the Common-
wealth and, in particular, a power to legislate with respect to the prevention and 
settlement of interstate industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration in 
s 51(xxxv). It was argued that the question of whether the corporations power 
can support the enactment of a national industrial relations regime under s 51(xx) 
has to be considered in light of the specific and limited power conferred by 
s 51(xxxv). Here, the plaintiffs relied upon structural-based arguments about the 
overall configuration of federal and state powers for which the Constitution as a 
whole provides, upon inter-provisional arguments about the relationship between 
ss 51(xx) and (xxxv), and upon cases in which ss 51(xx) and (xxxv) had been 
interpreted.25 The plaintiffs claimed that judges, lawyers and politicians had 
uniformly assumed since federation that s 51(xxxv) places certain limits on the 
Commonwealth’s power over industrial relations, and that attempts to overcome 
those limitations through formal amendment of the Constitution have consis-
tently been rejected in referenda. In the absence of formal amendment, it was 
said, these limits should not be circumvented via an expansive interpretation of 
the corporations power. 
The principal problem for the plaintiffs was that this last line of reasoning 
smacked of the discredited reserved powers doctrine, widely said to have been 
‘exploded’ by the Engineers’ Case.26 The reason for this is that one of the 
 
 24 Sources cited included Federal Council of Australasia Act 1885 (Imp) 48 & 49 Vict, c 60, 
s 15(1); Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 3 April 1891, 
686 (James Munro, Sir Samuel Griffith, Sir John Bray) (‘Sydney National Debates’); Official 
Record of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, 12 April 1897, 439 (Ed-
mund Barton) (‘Adelaide Debates’); Adelaide Debates, 17 April 1897, 793 (Sir George Turner, 
Edmund Barton, Isaac Isaacs, Alfred Deakin, William McMillan, Josiah Symon, Sir Joseph 
Abbott); John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth (1901) 604–7; W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (2nd ed, 1910) 470; E Hilton Young, ‘The Status of Foreign Corporations and the 
Legislature’ (Pt I) (1907) 23 Law Quarterly Review 151; E Hilton Young, ‘The Status of Foreign 
Corporations and the Legislature’ (Pt II) (1907) 23 Law Quarterly Review 290. 
 25 On these and other types of argument in constitutional adjudication, see Philip Bobbitt, 
Constitutional Interpretation (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, ‘Intratextualism’ (1999) 112 Harvard 
Law Review 747. 
 26 See Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales [No 2] (1965) 113 CLR 54, 79 
(Barwick CJ); cf Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 66 (Rich J) 
(‘Melbourne Corporation’). 
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hallmarks of the doctrine is the idea that the limited terms in which a particular 
head of power is conferred upon the Commonwealth imply limitations on the 
scope of other heads of power. In other words, what is not granted under one 
head of power is treated as significant when determining the scope of what is 
granted under another. The proposition that what is not conferred under 
s 51(xxxv) suggests a limit on the scope of s 51(xx) is an argument of this type. 
However, since the plaintiffs disclaimed any reliance upon the opprobrious 
reserved powers doctrine, their problem was to identify some other ground upon 
which the scope of the corporations power might be defined and interpreted, 
referable both to the language of the corporations power itself and to previous 
cases. The plaintiffs’ strategy, in effect, was to break the argument down into a 
number of discrete elements and to argue those elements without acknowledging 
their relationship to reserved powers reasoning. 
The two dissenting justices, Kirby and Callinan JJ, found the arguments of the 
plaintiffs sufficiently compelling, with each judge in his own way formulating 
limits upon the scope of the corporations power by reference to the language of 
the power, the existence of the industrial arbitration power and the federal nature 
of the Constitution. However, a majority of the Court rejected these arguments in 
a joint judgment which focused almost entirely upon the language of s 51(xx) 
alone, discounted the force of the arguments based in federalism and the limited 
terms of the industrial arbitration power, and relied instead upon the line of 
previous decisions in which the scope of the corporations power had progres-
sively expanded. In a critical passage early in the joint judgment, the majority of 
the Court pointed out that the Engineers’ Case had overturned the reserved 
powers doctrine, that previously restrictive interpretations of the corporations 
power founded upon reserved powers reasoning had been overruled, and that 
subsequent well-established principles of constitutional interpretation made it 
improper to seek to ‘read down’ the scope of one head of power by reference to 
limits written into another.27 The majority thus upheld the entirety of the Work 
Choices Act, principally on the basis of the Commonwealth’s submissions that 
the corporations power extends to any law which alters the rights, powers or 
duties of a constitutional corporation, as well as to laws which have a less direct 
but nonetheless sufficiently substantial connection to constitutional corpora-
tions.28 
I I I   CONSTITUTIONAL HERESY 
The reserved powers doctrine is often misunderstood. The abridged version of 
the doctrine presents itself simply as the idea that there is some rather vaguely 
defined body of legislative powers that have been reserved to the states and into 
 
 27 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 70–3 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ). However, for a discussion of instances where limits on one head of power have 
been held to limit the scope of powers in another, see Part IV below, especially nn 129–35 and 
accompanying text. 
 28 For the majority’s summary of the Commonwealth’s submissions, see Work Choices Case 
(2006) 229 CLR 1, 76. 
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which federal legislative power cannot extend.29 If the content of this mysterious 
sphere of power reserved to the states is given any definition at all, it is de-
scribed as relating to the domestic or internal affairs of the states,30 to their 
traditional areas of law-making power31 or — without explaining why — it is 
sometimes referred to as particularly relating to state regulation of domestic 
trade.32 If there is any foundation for the doctrine in the text of the Constitution, 
reference is at best made to s 107,33 which under the reserved powers doctrine 
was somehow thought to reserve to the states control over their domestic affairs 
without federal interference.34 
When presented in this way, the reserved powers doctrine is easily subjected to 
at least three powerful lines of criticism. The first is that the doctrine seems to 
lack any real foundation in the text of the Constitution. Section 107 says that 
state powers shall ‘continue’ but it provides no positive guidance as to what 
those powers might be. Rather, it directs attention to powers conferred upon the 
Commonwealth or explicitly withdrawn from the states, and suggests that only 
once these have been ascertained is it possible to identify those state powers 
which are to continue. Thus, secondly, the reserved powers doctrine seems to 
reverse the proper order of inquiry required by s 107, for it suggests that the first 
question is one of identifying the powers reserved to the states and only after that 
is there a question of identifying the powers conferred upon the Commonwealth 
(with the proviso that this must be done in a way that prevents federal power 
from entering fields reserved to the states). However, s 107 appears to provide 
that the continuing powers of the states lying beyond the reach of the Common-
wealth are only those that are found to be left over after the positive powers 
conferred upon the Commonwealth have first been ascertained. Thirdly, and 
relatedly, the reserved powers doctrine appears to be a recipe for uncertainty and 
subjectivity. The absence of any clear guidance in the Constitution regarding the 
specific content of the powers reserved to the states suggests that judges will 
have to rely on any one of a number of ideas about the content of the properly 
‘domestic’ affairs of the states, ideas that have no basis in the text of the Consti-
tution. Recourse to unavoidably extra-constitutional notions such as these 
appears to be a recipe for arbitrary and unpredictable judicial decision-making.35 
 
 29 Katherine Lindsay, The Australian Constitution in Context (1999) 67; Patrick Keyzer, Constitu-
tional Law (2nd ed, 2005) 26. 
 30 R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41, 69 (Griffith CJ for Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ). See also 
Melissa Castan and Sarah Joseph, Federal Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (1st ed, 
2001) 44; Peter Hanks, Constitutional Law in Australia (2nd ed, 1996) 235–6, 294. 
 31 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commen-
tary and Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 296. 
 32 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 354 (Griffith CJ); Hanks, 
above n 30, 236. 
 33 Section 107 of the Constitution provides: 
Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, shall, un-
less it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or 
withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the Common-
wealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as the case may be. 
 34 Keven Booker, Arthur Glass and Robert Watt, Federal Constitutional Law: An Introduction 
(2nd ed, 1998) 40–1, cf 39–40. 
 35 See, eg, Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 145 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ).  
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However, this is to conjure with a mere caricature of the doctrine. In its strong-
est form, as enunciated by the Griffith Court, the reserved powers doctrine rested 
upon much firmer foundations than this account would suggest. These founda-
tions included: (1) a clear and defensible account of the political origins, 
underlying ideas, structural features and intended purposes of the Constitution; 
(2) a careful articulation of the grounds upon which the specific content of the 
powers reserved to the states can be identified — one that requires very close 
attention to be given to the precise terms in which federal heads of power are 
defined, such that what is not granted to the Commonwealth may be as signifi-
cant as what is granted; and (3) a sophisticated recognition that constitutional 
interpretation inevitably requires choices to be made and that these choices can 
be guided by a general orientation either to expand federal power as far as 
possible or to read federal power with an eye to the resulting impact on the 
remaining legislative powers of the states. The considerations raised in terms of 
the arguments (1) and (2) (some of which are discussed below) suggest that the 
latter, rather than the former, ought to be the Court’s preferred orientation. 
It is only with these three elements in view that the absolute and interpretive 
versions of the reserved powers doctrine can be understood. The absolute form 
of the doctrine asserts that there is a definite content to the powers reserved to 
the states and suggests that this creates a clear-cut and unqualified prohibition 
upon federal laws entering the reserved field. The interpretive version empha-
sises the interpretive choices that have to be made and gives the courts reason to 
consider the consequences for the states when deciding which interpretation of 
federal power is to be preferred. Both versions present the reserved powers 
doctrine in a form much stronger and more persuasive than the mere caricature 
that is the abridged version of the doctrine. 
The reserved powers doctrine in these stronger forms was articulated in a 
series of High Court decisions, beginning with Peterswald v Bartley36 in 1904 
and culminating in Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (‘Huddart 
Parker’)37 in 1909. To understand these cases, they need also to be read with the 
immunity of instrumentalities cases,38 beginning with D’Emden v Pedder39 in 
1904 and ending with Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees’ Union 
of Australia v Melbourne Corporation (‘Municipalities Case’)40 in 1919. 
 
 36 (1904) 1 CLR 497. 
 37 (1909) 8 CLR 330. The intermediate cases in the series were R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41; A-G 
(NSW) v Brewery Employes Union of New South Wales (1908) 6 CLR 469 (‘Union Label Case’). 
 38 Under the immunity of instrumentalities doctrine (also known as the doctrine of intergovern-
mental immunities), the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities were declared to be immune 
from any law passed by a state — and, conversely, the states and their instrumentalities were 
immune from laws passed by the Commonwealth — wherever such laws would in some way 
‘fetter, control, or interfere with, the free exercise of the legislative or executive power’ of the 
Commonwealth or the states, respectively: D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91, 111 (Grif-
fith CJ). 
 39 Ibid. 
 40 (1919) 26 CLR 508. Some of the intermediate immunity of instrumentalities cases were: 
Municipal Council of Sydney v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 208 (‘Municipal Rates Case’); 
Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585; Commonwealth v New South Wales (1906) 3 CLR 807; 
Federated Amalgamated Governmental Railway and Tramway Service Association v New South 
Wales Railway Traffic Employes Association (1906) 4 CLR 488 (‘Railway Servants’ Case’); 
Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087 (‘Baxter’); A-G 
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The reserved powers doctrine rested on a conception of the Australian Consti-
tution in which it received its political legitimacy and essential federal structure 
from a federating compact negotiated between elected representatives of the 
several constituent states and ratified by their respective voters.41 The framers of 
the Constitution derived this idea of a federating compact from their reading of a 
range of contemporary writers on the subject of federalism, the most influential 
of whom were James Madison, James Bryce, Edward Freeman and Albert Venn 
Dicey.42 All of these writers characterised federal systems as being authentically 
founded upon treaty-like agreements between constituent states.43 Madison in 
particular — whose analysis of the United States Constitution was of strategic 
importance at a number of points in the debate over Australian federation44 — 
pointed to a systematic relationship between the formative basis of federal 
systems and the representative structures, the configurations of legislative and 
executive power, and the amendment processes adopted therein.45 Partly because 
the Australians were influenced by Madison, and partly because Madison’s 
analysis provided a general insight into the essential dynamics of federal 
constitution-making, the debate over the drafting of the Australian Constitution, 
as well as the structure of the Constitution that emerged from that process, 
reflected this relationship between formation, representation, configuration of 
power and amendment.46 
In line with this conception, virtually all of the framers of the Constitution had 
to admit — and most of them were positively supportive of the fact — that the 
Australian colonies came into the federation as equal contracting parties possess-
ing mutually independent self-governing powers, including a capacity to 
determine their own constitutional destinies in a manner substantially free from 
Imperial interference.47 In the view of the framers, although the legal force of the 
Constitution would have to depend upon the Imperial Parliament, the political 
legitimacy, as well as the underlying ideas, general structures and specific 
 
(NSW) v Collector of Customs (NSW) (1908) 5 CLR 818; Federated Engine-Drivers and Fire-
men’s Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1912) 16 CLR 245. 
 41 Railway Servants’ Case (1906) 4 CLR 488, 534 (Griffith CJ for Griffith CJ, Barton and 
O’Connor JJ); Baxter (1907) 4 CLR 1087, 1104, 1121, 1126 (Griffith CJ for Griffith CJ, Barton 
and O’Connor JJ). 
 42 For a fuller discussion, see Nicholas Aroney, ‘“A Commonwealth of Commonwealths”: Late 
Nineteenth-Century Conceptions of Federalism and Their Impact on Australian Federation, 
1890–1901’ (2002) 23 Journal of Legal History 253. 
 43 See, eg, James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (2nd ed, 1889) 12–15, 17–22; A V Dicey, 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (5th ed, 1897) 137–8, 139. 
 44 See Nicholas Aroney, ‘Imagining a Federal Commonwealth: Australian Conceptions of 
Federalism, 1890–1901’ (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 265. 
 45 For a fuller discussion, see Nicholas Aroney, ‘Formation, Representation and Amendment in 
Federal Constitutions’ (2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 277. 
 46 See Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning 
of the Australian Constitution (2008, forthcoming). 
 47 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Melbourne, 10 February 
1890, 10 (Sir Samuel Griffith) (‘we have become practically almost sovereign states, a great 
deal more sovereign states, though not in name, than the separate states of America’). For at-
tempts by Henry Bourne Higgins to deny this premise or avoid its implications, see Official 
Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Sydney, 9 September 1897,  
259–60 (Henry Bourne Higgins); Adelaide Debates, 15 April 1897, above n 24, 665–6 (Henry 
Bourne Higgins). 
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language of the Constitution, all owed their inspiration to local Australian 
sources.48 In this context, when it came to the configuration of legislative power 
between the Commonwealth and the states, the states were seen as possessing 
original powers of local self-government, which they specifically insisted would 
continue under the Constitution subject only to the carefully defined and limited 
powers specifically conferred upon the Commonwealth.49 The Commonwealth 
was, in other words, a creature of the Constitution, and its powers were strictly 
enumerated and limited.50 Thus, while the Canadian Constitution suggested a 
model in which the legislative powers of the states might be explicitly defined,51 
the Australians understood this to be a result of the much more centralised model 
adopted in that country and out of tune with the genuinely federal origin and 
structure of the Australian Constitution, modelled as it was upon the American 
and Swiss examples.52 
The Griffith Court deliberately sought to apply this general conception of the 
Constitution in its decisions.53 Although the Court rejected the admissibility of 
opinions expressed by individual delegates at the Federal Conventions of the 
1890s, references to the successive drafts of the Constitution Bill were not 
prohibited,54 and nor was there a bar to drawing inferences from the text and 
structure of the Constitution, a document that appeared so clearly to the Court to 
reflect this overarching conception.55 Moreover, where the meaning and inten-
tion were not clear from the text, the Court thought that it would be appropriate 
to consider the ‘contemporaneous circumstances’ and the historical facts 
surrounding the process of bringing the Constitution into existence.56 After all, 
 
 48 A point especially emphasised by Griffith CJ in Baxter (1907) 4 CLR 1087, 1111–12. See also 
Peterswald v Bartley (1904) 1 CLR 497, 509 (Griffith CJ). 
 49 Constitution ss 106–7, 109. Great care was taken in defining the legislative powers of the 
Commonwealth, even though with the benefit of hindsight it is possible to observe that the High 
Court, following a method of interpretation quite out of tune with the understandings and expec-
tations of the framers, has construed those powers in ways that the framers could not have an-
ticipated and most would not have endorsed. 
 50 See R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41, 67 (Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ). 
 51 See Constitution Act 1867 (Imp) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 91–2, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, 
No 5. 
 52 Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585, 605–6 (Griffith CJ). In George Winterton, ‘The High Court 
and Federalism: A Centenary Evaluation’ in Peter Cane (ed), Centenary Essays for the High 
Court of Australia (2004) 197, 204 (citations omitted), Winterton argues that the decision not to 
follow the Canadian model in this respect ‘has turned out to be a serious misjudgement for 
which the High Court can scarcely be blamed.’ Cf Christopher D Gilbert, Australian and Cana-
dian Federalism 1867–1984: A Study of Judicial Techniques (1986) for the view that Canadian 
doctrine has also been shaped by the unique social and political conditions of that country. 
 53 Griffith CJ emphasised that the Court should look to the general scheme of the Constitution as a 
whole in determining what powers and capacities were intended to be conferred upon the Com-
monwealth and withdrawn from the states: see Peterswald v Bartley (1904) 1 CLR 497, 507. For 
Griffith’s own view of federalism, see Nicholas Aroney, ‘Sir Samuel Griffith’s Vision of Austra-
lian Federalism’ in Michael White and Aladin Rahemtula (eds), Sir Samuel Walker Griffith: The 
Law and the Constitution (2002) 179. 
 54 Tasmania v Commonwealth (1904) 1 CLR 329, 333 (Griffith CJ, during argument). 
 55 See, eg, ibid 345–58 (Barton J). 
 56 Ibid 359 (O’Connor J). See also at 350–5 (Barton J). See further A-G (Cth) ex rel 
McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, 17 (Barwick CJ). For relatively more recent 
examples of admitting evidence concerning the contemporary meaning of language used in the 
Constitution, see Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, 
Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Re Federated Storemen and Packers Union of Austra-
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the then Chief Justice, Sir Samuel Griffith, had himself been the acknowledged 
leader of the Convention of 1891, Sir Edmund Barton had been the acknowl-
edged leader of the Convention of 1897–98, and Richard O’Connor had been one 
of Barton’s closest associates.57 There were few in existence who could have 
better understood the process by which the Constitution had been brought into 
being, including its animating ideas and the pattern of debate, than these three 
judges. 
To be sure, Isaacs and Higgins JJ understood the process perhaps equally well, 
but during the debates they had very consistently found themselves in the 
minority on the key issues concerning the design of the federation and the 
balance of power between the Commonwealth and the states58 and they had no 
formal role in the drafting committees.59 There is, accordingly, substantial reason 
to question the reliability of their views about the underlying ideas, the consen-
sus of opinion and the general objectives of federation. As it turned out, though 
Higgins J had been the more radical of the two and was more likely to be in the 
minority at the Federal Conventions, in his judgments he seems to have been 
more forthright about the respects in which the Constitution did not in fact 
conform to his preferred model of federalism. Isaacs J, however, tended more 
often to read the Constitution in terms of his own preconceptions.60 By contrast, 
because Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ took a leading role in the actual 
drafting and progressive refinement of the various versions of the Constitution 
Bill as it passed through the Federal Conventions, they were acutely conscious of 
two things: that the powers conferred on the Commonwealth had been drafted 
carefully so as to restrict the Commonwealth to particular fields of operation; 
and, furthermore, that the general understanding had been that each head of 
power served not only to define the powers of the Commonwealth but also to 
mark out that which was not granted and was therefore to be reserved to the 
states.61 After all, on the conception of the Constitution which they entertained, 
the powers of the states were original and primary, while the powers of the 
Commonwealth were derivative and secondary. 
 
lia; Ex parte Wooldumpers (Victoria) Ltd (1989) 166 CLR 311, 329–30 (Deane J). The High 
Court has also accepted that the history of a provision of the Constitution may be referred to 
when determining ‘the nature and objectives of the movement towards federation from which 
the compact of the Constitution finally emerged’: Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385 
(Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). For a discussion of 
historical evidence, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’ 
(1997) 25 Federal Law Review 1, 13–15; James A Thomson, ‘Constitutional Interpretation: 
History and the High Court — A Bibliographical Survey’ (1982) 5 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 309, 310. 
 57 See Aroney, above n 46, chs 7–11. 
 58 Ibid. 
 59 Ibid ch 6. 
 60 The respective judgments of Isaacs and Higgins JJ in Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330,  
381–408 (Isaacs J), 408–19 (Higgins J) amply illustrate this difference between the two judges. 
 61 See, eg, Sydney National Debates, 3 April 1891, above n 24, 699 (Andrew Inglis Clark); Official 
Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 3 February 1898, 
502–4 (Edmund Barton), 504–5 (Josiah Symon) (‘Melbourne National Debates’); Melbourne 
National Debates, 7 February 1898, 596–7, 600 (Edmund Barton and Isaac Isaacs); Melbourne 
National Debates, 16 February 1898, 1008–10 (Edmund Barton and Richard O’Connor). 
     
2008] Constitutional Choices in the Work Choices Case 15 
     
In the particular cases that came before the Griffith Court, this outlook had to 
be put into operation. There can be no doubt that the cases often raised issues 
that had not been contemplated by any of the framers, at least not in public 
debate. Nor can there be any doubt that specific opinions held by the framers 
concerning the precise meaning to be attributed to each head of power some-
times differed, occasionally in significant respects. Indeed, members of the Court 
recognised the range of interpretive choices that the text of the Constitution left 
open to them as judges.62 However, in this context, the Court sought to interpret 
the legislative powers conferred upon the Commonwealth so as to give due 
weight to the notion that decisions about what would not be granted to the 
Commonwealth were as significant as decisions about what would be granted. 
This approach was made specific in two ways. First, not only did limitations 
suggested by the closely defined language of particular heads of power mean 
that the scope of Commonwealth legislative power under that head had to be 
duly limited, but it was also taken to mean that those definitions had implications 
for how other heads of power ought to be interpreted. At the time, particular 
attention was given to the Commonwealth’s power to legislate with respect to 
interstate trade and commerce under s 51(i) of the Constitution. The Griffith 
Court seems to have understood this as perhaps the most significant head of 
power: drafted in language very similar to the vastly important commerce power 
in the United States, it was deliberately placed first in the list of Australian 
federal powers because it was seen by the framers to be of prime importance.63 
Certainly, it conferred power on the Commonwealth to legislate with respect to 
interstate trade and commerce, but just as important was the fact that the 
Commonwealth was not granted power to regulate intrastate trade and com-
merce. Now, the Court recognised that some heads of power might unavoidably 
allow the Commonwealth to make laws that would in certain ways regulate trade 
and commerce of an entirely intrastate character. However, the Court considered 
that this situation should only be found to be the case where the head of power 
made this unquestionably clear. If a power was reasonably capable of having two 
or more meanings, one of which would not justify such an intrusion, then the 
Court tended to conclude that the less intrusive construction was to be pre-
ferred.64 
As a consequence, the implied prohibition on Commonwealth legislative 
power suggested by the reserved powers doctrine — though sometimes ex-
pressed as if it were absolute — was more in the nature of a rebuttable presump-
 
 62 In relation to the corporations power in particular, see Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 354 
(Griffith CJ), 363 (Barton J), 369 (O’Connor J). 
 63 On the significance and meaning of the power, see Sydney National Debates, 31 March 1891, 
above n 24, 524 (Sir Samuel Griffith); Sydney National Debates, 1 April 1891, above n 24, 541 
(Henry Wrixon); Sydney National Debates, 3 April 1891, above n 24, 662–70 (Sir Samuel Grif-
fith, Andrew Inglis Clark, Sir John Downer, Henry Wrixon, Thomas Playford, Sir Harry Atkin-
son); Adelaide Debates, 31 March 1897, above n 24, 371 (Edmund Barton); Adelaide Debates, 
17 April 1897, above n 24, 830 (Alfred Deakin); Adelaide Debates, 21 April 1897, above n 24, 
1108 (Edmund Barton); Adelaide Debates, 22 April 1897, above n 24, 1142 (Isaac Isaacs). 
 64 Perhaps the clearest statement of this reasoning appears in the Union Label Case (1908) 6 CLR 
469, 502–3 (Griffith CJ). 
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tion.65 A restrictive interpretation of a federal power was not to be adopted unless 
it was capable of being supported by a defensible interpretation of the actual 
language used in the head of power in question. The Griffith Court was thus 
conscious of the interpretive choices available to it, and the reserved powers 
doctrine gave the Court a persuasive reason to choose the most narrow, and yet 
defensible, interpretation of Commonwealth power possible. In this way, the 
Commonwealth’s legislative powers were interpreted with a view to maintaining 
a kind of balance of power between the Commonwealth and the states.66 
However, this did not necessarily entail a belief that there was some clearly 
defined federal balance easily accessible to the Court, like some brooding 
omnipresence in the sky. Interpretive choices had to be made, and the reserved 
powers method provided guidance for how this was to be done. 
Huddart Parker is as good an example of reserved powers reasoning as any, 
and it is also the first case in which the Court had to consider the scope of the 
corporations power. The question the Court had to determine was whether the 
corporations power supported the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 
(Cth). Section 5 of the Act was enacted to prohibit combinations of corporations 
that had an intent to ‘restrain trade or commerce within the Commonwealth to 
the detriment of the public’ or ‘destroy or injure by means of unfair competition 
any Australian industry the preservation of which is advantageous to the Com-
monwealth’. Section 8 further prohibited activity that: 
[monopolised] … any part of the trade or commerce within the Common-
wealth, with intent to control, to the detriment of the public, the supply or price 
of any service, merchandise, or commodity … 
Griffith CJ, Barton, O’Connor and Higgins JJ (Isaacs J dissenting) held that 
the provisions were invalid. Griffith CJ and Barton J considered that the corpora-
tions power extended only to determining which corporations may engage in 
trade and commerce within a state, prohibiting some, allowing others, and doing 
 
 65 While there are a number of rather categorical statements which, read out of context, seem to 
suggest an absolute prohibition on federal legislation regulating intrastate trade and commerce, 
the qualifying language of O’Connor J in Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 370 is typical: 
‘The grant of power to the Parliament must thus be so construed as to be consistent as far as 
possible with the exclusive control over its internal trade and commerce vested in the State’ 
(emphasis added). See also Barton J, who thought the critical question was whether the corpora-
tions power constituted an exception to what he called the ‘otherwise exclusive reservation to 
the States of the power [to regulate domestic trade]’, but required that any such exception be 
established ‘in clear and unambiguous terms’: at 363 (emphasis added). See also R v Barger 
(1908) 6 CLR 41, 69 (Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ); Union Label Case (1908) 6 CLR 
469, 502–3 (Griffith CJ). The latter case contains a strongly absolutist statement, followed by an 
interpretive qualification at 503 (citations omitted): 
the power to legislate as to internal trade and commerce is reserved to the State by the opera-
tion of sec 107, to the exclusion of the Commonwealth, and this as fully and effectively as if 
sec 51(i) had contained negative words prohibiting the exercise of such powers by the Com-
monwealth Parliament, except only … ‘as a necessary and proper means for carrying into exe-
cution some other power expressly granted.’ 
 66 This is a point that is particularly clear in R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41, 77 (Griffith CJ, Barton 
and O’Connor JJ), where the Court was concerned to prevent the taxation power being used by 
the Commonwealth to ‘assume and exercise complete control over every act of every person in 
the Commonwealth by the simple method of imposing a pecuniary liability on every one who 
did not conform to specified rules of action, and calling that obligation a tax’. 
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this by imposing conditions regulating such engagement.67 The power did not, 
therefore, extend to regulating activities of corporations once they were author-
ised to engage in trade and commerce. Sections 5 and 8 regulated matters 
relating to trade and commerce generally, and thus the question was whether 
those provisions were ‘truly ancillary to the power to make laws with respect to 
certain corporations, whatever that may extend to, or [were] an invasion of the 
field of domestic trade, a matter which is reserved to the States.’68 
In Griffith CJ’s reasoning, the words in s 51(xx) of the Constitution, when read 
alone, are capable of bearing a very wide construction, but these ‘indefinite’ 
words are subject to what he called the ‘definite and distinct’ stipulation arising 
from s 51(i) that the regulation of intrastate trade and commerce be reserved to 
the states.69 While putting it this way might suggest an absolute conception of 
the reserved powers doctrine, Griffith CJ seemed to understand it in interpretive 
terms for he accepted that the reservation of state power could be rebutted, 
provided that any such exception to the reservation was ‘clearly and unequivo-
cally expressed’.70 Thus, as the Chief Justice later explained, while the words in 
s 51(xx) are open to two different constructions, the narrower should be adopted 
for the power ‘ought not to be construed as authorizing the Commonwealth to 
invade the field of State law as to domestic trade’.71 There is again some 
absolutism in this statement,72 but it is placed in an interpretive context. 
While rejecting the reserved powers reasoning adopted by the other justices of 
the majority, Higgins J agreed with the result, adding that if the power in 
s 51(xx) was given a wide meaning the results would be ‘certainly extraordinary, 
big with confusion.’73 He also catalogued a whole series of ways in which the 
federal Parliament would be enabled to legislate in spheres not specifically 
delegated to it.74 On Higgins J’s list of what were later dubbed ‘horribles’75 was 
the possibility that the corporations power might be used to regulate such diverse 
matters as libel laws, liquor licensing, interest rates, religious practices, alcohol 
consumption and, most significantly for the Work Choices Case, the wages and 
salaries of employees.76 Griffith CJ expanded on this last example, noting the 
possibility of federal legislation that prescribed the persons whom a corporation 
 
 67 Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 353–4 (Griffith CJ), 364 (Barton J). 
 68 Ibid 350 (Griffith CJ). 
 69 Ibid, citing the majority’s judgment in R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41, 72 (Griffith CJ, Barton and 
O’Connor JJ). See further ibid 350–2 (Griffith CJ). In fact, when read against ss 4 and 7, ss 5 
and 8 attempted to avoid the limitation of power in s 51 (xx) — ss 4 and 7, relying on s 51(i), 
applied only to interstate and international trade, whereas ss 5 and 8 acknowledged the limits on 
the power in s 51(i) and relied on s 51(xx) to avoid that limitation: ibid 360–1 (Barton J). 
 70 Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 352. 
 71 Ibid 354. 
 72 See also ibid 365–6 (Barton J): ‘Such an expedient will not avail to pierce the shield which the 
Constitution throws round the internal trade of the States … [for] the dog can wag the tail, but it 
by no means follows that the tail can wag the dog.’ 
 73 Ibid 409. 
 74 Ibid 409–10. 
 75 P H Lane, The Australian Federal System (1979) 160. 
 76 Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 409–10. 
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could employ, their hours and conditions, and what remuneration would be paid 
to them.77 
The significance of Higgins J’s concurring judgment in Huddart Parker par-
ticularly lies in the fact that he was no friend of the reserved powers doctrine in 
its technical sense.78 In his judgment, however, he was able to carve out a limited 
scope of the corporations power which was defensible on the language of the 
section and the nature of the subject matter. For Higgins J, the long list of 
horribles provided a strong reason to adopt a restrictive interpretation. For the 
other members of the majority, these possible consequences were also important, 
but the reserved powers logic provided an additional set of reasons to adopt a 
restrictive interpretation and provided some specific (although not conclusive) 
guidance on what that interpretation might be. 
IV  CONSTITUTIONAL ORTHODOXY 
The reign of the reserved powers doctrine came to an end when it was effec-
tively deposed by the Engineers’ Case in 1920.79 The Engineers’ Case is widely, 
and accurately, thought to be strategically the most important constitutional 
decision ever handed down by the High Court of Australia.80 Notwithstanding 
chinks in its armour and doubts about its standing that have emerged in recent 
years,81 a resilient core of the decision remains and was invoked repeatedly in 
the Work Choices Case, not only in the majority’s joint judgment, but also in the 
dissenting judgments of Kirby and Callinan JJ.82 
 
 77 Ibid 348. 
 78 Nor did he favour, as a matter of constitutional design, the limited terms in which the Common-
wealth’s power over industrial matters had been defined in s 51(xxxv) of the Constitution: see 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 August 1903, 3467 
(Henry Bourne Higgins). 
 79 The matter arose out of an industrial dispute between the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, a 
trade union, and some 844 employers throughout Australia, including three state government 
instrumentalities of Western Australia. The question was whether the Commonwealth under its 
industrial arbitration power (Constitution s 51(xxxv)) has the ability to make laws that are bind-
ing on state instrumentalities. The Court decided that the Commonwealth did have that legisla-
tive power, overturning the immunity of state instrumentalities from federal laws and, by impli-
cation, radically undermining the approach to interpreting the Constitution that the High Court 
had followed for 17 years previously. 
 80 Sir Robert Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth: An Examination of the 
Growth of Commonwealth Power in the Australian Federation (1967) 30 (‘a landmark in Aus-
tralian constitutional interpretation’); Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 
1997) 8 (‘it probably remains the most important case in Australian constitutional law, at any 
rate, from the point of view of principles of general interpretation’). Cf Melbourne Corporation 
(1947) 74 CLR 31, 78 (Dixon J) (‘stripped of embellishment and reduced to the form of a legal 
proposition’, the proposition established by the Engineers’ Case is simply to assert the 
‘prima-facie rule … that a power to legislate with respect to a given subject enables the Parlia-
ment to make laws which, upon that subject, affect the operations of the States and their agen-
cies’). See also Leslie Zines, ‘Changing Attitudes to Federalism and Its Purpose’ in Robert 
French, Geoffrey Lindell and Cheryl Saunders (eds), Reflections on the Australian Constitution 
(2003) 86, 88. 
 81 See, eg, George Williams, ‘Engineers Is Dead, Long Live the Engineers!’ (1995) 17 Sydney Law 
Review 62; Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), How Many Cheers for Engineers? 
(1997). 
 82 See the references in Part V below. 
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The Engineers’ Case elaborated a particular method of interpretation premised 
on a certain view of the Constitution’s fundamental nature and purpose.83 Prior 
to the case, the High Court had interpreted the Constitution with regard to its 
character as a federal compact between the peoples of the separate colonies of 
Australia, a conception that the judges no doubt considered to be in line with the 
consensus of opinion among the framers of the Constitution. However, in the 
Engineers’ Case, the High Court under the intellectual leadership of Isaacs J 
insisted that the Constitution was rather to be understood as a statute of the 
Imperial Parliament and was to be interpreted as such, according to ordinary 
principles of statutory interpretation.84 The Court thus rejected the American 
theories and precedents with which federalism was associated and insisted that 
specifically British political ideas and exegetical methods should inform and 
guide the Court. In substitution for the American idea of federalism, the Court 
asserted that the British system of parliamentary responsible government was 
especially fundamental to the system.85 Interpreting the Constitution in accor-
dance with the received principles of statutory interpretation meant that its 
fundamental objectives had to be discerned in the intentions of the enacting body 
insofar as those intentions could be ascertained from the actual words used in the 
text of the Constitution, understood in their ordinary and natural sense.86 More 
importantly, interpreting the Constitution as an Act of the Imperial Parliament 
suggested that the grants of power conferred upon the Commonwealth ought to 
be interpreted with as much liberality as possible.87 The Constitution should not 
be interpreted in light of what the Court disparaged as ‘no more [a] definite 
standard than the personal opinion of the Judge who declares it.’88 While the 
 
 83 Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 148–50 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). Delivered 
by Isaacs J, the Engineers’ joint judgment set out an approach to interpretation that Isaacs J had 
developed in a series of dissenting judgments in previous cases. In relation to Isaacs J’s earlier 
rejection of the reserved powers doctrine, see R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41, 81–111; Huddart 
Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 381–408. 
 84 Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 148–54 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ), 161–2 
(Higgins J). See also Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585, 596–7 (Isaacs KC, during argument); 
Webb v Outtrim (1906) 4 CLR 356. The contrast between the pre- and post-Engineers’ ap-
proaches can be overstated. Before the Engineers’ Case, the High Court had also stated that the 
Constitution is to be interpreted according to the received principles of statutory interpretation. 
The difference between the two approaches lay rather in the way that these principles were 
applied and, more importantly, in different opinions concerning the fundamental nature and 
purposes of the Constitution. 
 85 Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 146–8 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). What exactly 
this amounted to, and how responsible government was precisely relevant to the question at 
hand, was not made clear in the joint judgment. For discussion of this, see Stephen Gageler, 
‘Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial Review’ (1987) 17 Federal Law 
Review 162, 181–95. 
 86 Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 142, 148–9 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). 
 87 The Court maintained that the grant of legislative power to the Commonwealth within its 
jurisdiction is ‘as plenary and as ample’ as the powers of the British Parliament in its sovereignty 
could bestow: ibid 153, citing Hodge v The Queen (1883) 9 App Cas 117, 132. The Court also 
pointed out that the ‘possible abuse of powers is no reason in British law for limiting the natural 
force of the language creating them’: at 151. 
 88 Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 142 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). In Huddart 
Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 388, Isaacs J had affirmed that the Court ought to be guided solely by 
the language of the Constitution, rather than ‘wander[ing] at large upon a sea of speculation 
searching for a suitable intent by the misty and uncertain light of what is sometimes called the 
spirit of the document’ based on the subjective ‘preconceptions of the individual observer.’ In 
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Court might be entitled to discern and apply certain implied doctrines and 
principles in its interpretation, such inferences must be based upon the words 
used and their ‘necessarily implied meaning.’89 
Applying these conceptual and interpretive principles to the issues raised in the 
Engineers’ Case, the Court next concluded that the received doctrine of the 
immunity of state instrumentalities from federal interference had to be entirely 
rejected and that the immunity of federal instrumentalities from state interference 
had to be reinterpreted. This was not to be done (as it had been) on the basis of a 
kind of dual sovereignty of both the Commonwealth and the states, but on the 
basis of the putative supremacy of the Commonwealth over and against the 
states.90 Although on the facts of the case it was strictly unnecessary for the 
Court to express any view on the reserved powers doctrine, the reasoning 
adopted in the Engineers’ Case meant that this doctrine could not stand.91 The 
Court thus observed that s 51(xxxv) of the Constitution grants legislative power 
in general terms — with no exception for industrial disputes where states are 
parties — and that there is no provision elsewhere in the Constitution explicitly 
cutting down the scope of the power.92 It followed that full effect must be given 
to this grant of power, without considering any sphere of powers supposedly 
reserved to the states.93 As Higgins and Isaacs JJ had previously maintained, the 
competencies left to the states are merely the ‘residue’ of powers that remain 
after full effect is given to all of the powers positively conferred upon the 
Commonwealth.94 Isaacs J had said that ‘[i]t is contrary to reason to shorten the 
expressly granted powers by the undefined residuum. As well might the prece-
dent gift in a will be limited by first assuming the extent of the ultimate resi-
due.’95 Or, as he more tersely and directly put it elsewhere: ‘It is always a 
question of grant, not of prohibition, unless that is express.’96 
 
order to secure ‘certainty’ or ‘stability’ in the Constitution, he continued, the Court must adhere 
to the language of the Constitution and ensure that ‘fair and full effect [is] given to the words 
employed, construed according to the recognized British rules of interpretation’. 
 89 Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 155 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). 
 90 Ibid 156–60 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). While fundamental to the High Court’s later 
decision in Commonwealth v Cigamatic Pty Ltd (in liq) (1962) 108 CLR 372 (‘Cigamatic’), this 
was a dubious inference quite inconsistent with the Engineers’ Case’s supposed ‘textual literal-
ism’ because the nearest reference to anything resembling federal ‘supremacy’ in the Constitu-
tion is s 109, which provides that in the case of inconsistency between federal and state laws the 
federal law will ‘prevail’. Even then, s 109 is concerned only with the ‘supremacy’ of validly 
enacted federal laws over validly enacted state laws. By contrast, the immunity of instrumentali-
ties doctrine is concerned with the prior and distinct question of whether federal laws are validly 
enacted or can have a valid operation in respect of the executive governments of the states. 
 91 See Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 155 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ), where the 
implied prohibition doctrine (another name for the reserved powers doctrine) was explicitly 
rejected. 
 92 Ibid 154. 
 93 As Higgins J had put it in Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 415: the powers left to the states 
cannot be determined ‘until the utmost limits of all the powers conferred on [the Common-
wealth] Parliament by sec 51 have been ascertained.’ 
 94 R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41, 83–5 (Isaacs J), 113 (Higgins J). 
 95 Ibid 84. 
 96 Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 391 (emphasis in original). 
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Now it is true that the Engineers’ Case has been severely criticised,97 and 
many of its fundamental propositions have been subverted. The idea that the 
Constitution is to be interpreted as a statute of the Imperial Parliament has been 
seriously undermined recently by the suggestion that the Constitution really 
derives its force from the Australian people.98 Several of the Court’s most 
adventurous constitutional decisions of the 1990s — particularly those relating to 
the implied freedom of political communication — have drawn on the idea that 
the Constitution is thus founded on popular, rather than Imperial, sovereignty.99 
However, as important (albeit indeterminate) as this development might be,100 it 
is not one that has much potential to undermine the resilient core of the Engi-
neers’ Case. This is because, for a start, it was in the Engineers’ Case itself that 
the Court first deliberately articulated the idea that, politically conceived, the 
Constitution rested upon the consent of the people of Australia as a whole.101 
Likewise, it was in the Engineers’ Case that the Court first emphasised the 
doctrine of responsible government over and against the idea of federalism,102 
and it was a conception of responsible government and representative democracy 
that subsequently lay at the foundation of the implied freedom of political 
communication.103 
It is also important to acknowledge that the assault in the Engineers’ Case 
upon the immunity of instrumentalities doctrine has been repelled in certain 
respects. Less than 30 years after the Engineers’ Case was decided, the High 
Court, under the influence of Sir Owen Dixon, insisted that federalism is indeed 
 
 97 T C Brennan, Interpreting the Constitution: A Politico-Legal Essay (1935); John Latham, 
‘Interpretation of the Constitution’ in R Else-Mitchell (ed), Essays on the Australian Constitu-
tion (1952) 1, 33; Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) 197–201; An-
drew W Fraser, The Spirit of the Laws: Republicanism and the Unfinished Project of Modernity 
(1990) 244–51; Brian Galligan, A Federal Republic: Australia’s Constitutional System of Gov-
ernment (1995) 188; David Meale, ‘The History of the Federal Idea in Australian Constitutional 
Jurisprudence: A Reappraisal’ (1992) 8 Australian Journal of Law and Society 25, 53–4; Zines, 
The High Court and the Constitution, above n 80, 10–14; Geoffrey de Q Walker, ‘The Seven 
Pillars of Centralism: Engineers’ Case and Federalism’ (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 678.  
 98 G J Lindell, ‘Why Is Australia’s Constitution Binding? — The Reasons in 1900 and Now, and 
the Effect of Independence’ (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 29; Justice Michael D Kirby, ‘De-
akin: Popular Sovereignty and the True Foundation of the Australian Constitution’ (1996) 3 
Deakin Law Review 129; Simon Evans, ‘Why Is the Constitution Binding? Authority, Obligation 
and the Role of the People’ (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 103. 
 99 See, eg, Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 
(Mason CJ), 210–11 (Gaudron J), 228 (McHugh J); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 
CLR 1, 69–74 (Deane and Toohey JJ); Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 475 (Bren-
nan J), 483–4, 486 (Deane and Toohey JJ); Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 
182 CLR 104, 171 (Deane J); Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 
520. 
100 See George Winterton, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Continuity’ (1998) 26 Federal 
Law Review 1; Nicholas Aroney, ‘A Public Choice? Federalism and the Prospects of a Republi-
can Preamble’ (1999) 20 University of Queensland Law Journal 262. 
101 Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 153 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). I say this was 
deliberate because Isaacs J’s account of the Constitution as deriving from the Australian people 
directly contradicted the proposition that the Constitution derived its political force from the 
consent of the several peoples of the separate colonies. 
102 Ibid 146–8 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). 
103 See generally Nicholas Aroney, Freedom of Speech in the Constitution (1998); Nicholas Aroney, 
‘Justice McHugh, Representative Government and the Elimination of Balancing’ (2006) 28 
Sydney Law Review 505. 
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an integral part of the Constitution. This had important implications for its 
interpretation. Dixon CJ seems never to have been particularly fond of the 
Engineers’ Case,104 and he capitalised on some of the qualifications expressed in 
the judgment to formulate a modified Commonwealth and state immunity 
doctrine.105 Thus, while the Engineers’ Court certainly abandoned the immunity 
of instrumentalities doctrine in its strong form, it was not too long before a 
qualified, two-track instrumentalities immunity re-emerged in Melbourne 
Corporation v Commonwealth (‘Melbourne Corporation’)106 and in Common-
wealth v Cigamatic Pty Ltd (in liq) (‘Cigamatic’).107 This latter version of the 
doctrine has recently been reaffirmed (although recast) in Re Residential 
Tenancies Tribunal of New South Wales; Ex parte Defence Housing Authority108 
and in Austin v Commonwealth.109 
However, despite the points at which the underlying assumptions of the Engi-
neers’ Case have been undermined and its specific holdings qualified, as the 
judgments in the Work Choices Case demonstrate, the authority of the Engi-
neers’ Case in relation to the interpretation of federal legislative power continues 
undiminished. A resilient core remains, namely, the proposition that federal 
legislative powers are to be interpreted in priority to, and without substantial 
consideration of, the remaining legislative capacities of the states.110 The 
proposition rests on the premise that the Constitution is to be construed by 
reference to the actual words used, understood in their ordinary and natural 
sense, without regard to the political or policy implications of the resulting 
interpretation.111 This proposition was a direct challenge to the reserved powers 
doctrine for it implied that each head of federal power should be interpreted as 
widely as the language used allows, without regard to the impact that interpreta-
tion has upon the residual legislative powers of the states. 
As such, there is more to the Engineers’ decision than the proposition that state 
legislative powers are merely residual in nature. The theory is not merely a 
recapitulation of the language of ss 51 and 107 of the Constitution. The doctrine 
 
104 Sawer, above n 97, 133. 
105 See, eg, West v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 657, 681–3 (Dixon J); Re 
Richard Foreman & Sons Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1947) 74 CLR 508, 
528–32 (Dixon J). 
106 (1947) 74 CLR 31, 78–82 (Dixon J). 
107 (1962) 108 CLR 372, 376–8 (Dixon CJ). For a critique of Cigamatic, see R P Meagher and 
W M C Gummow, ‘Sir Owen Dixon’s Heresy’ (1980) 54 Australian Law Journal 25; cf Leslie 
Zines, ‘Sir Owen Dixon’s Theory of Federalism’ (1965) 1 Federal Law Review 221. 
108 (1997) 190 CLR 410. 
109 (2003) 215 CLR 185. In this case, a majority recast the account of the immunity of instrumen-
talities doctrine as it had come to be formulated in cases such as Queensland Electricity Com-
mission v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192 and Re Australian Education Union; Ex parte 
Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188. For a recent discussion, see Anne Twomey, ‘Federal Limitations 
on the Legislative Power of the States and the Commonwealth to Bind One Another’ (2003) 31 
Federal Law Review 507. 
110 Cf R D Lumb, ‘Problems of Characterization of Federal Powers in the High Court’ (1982) 
Australian Current Law Digest AT–45, suggesting that a doctrine of ‘federal balance’ was still 
discernible in the cases. However, this was written before the decision in the Tasmanian Dam 
Case (1983) 158 CLR 1. See also R D Lumb, ‘The Franklin Dam Decision and the External 
Affairs Power: A Comment’ (1984) 13 University of Queensland Law Journal 138. 
111 Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 142, 148–9 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). 
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is not exhausted by the methodological observation that the powers left to the 
states under s 107 cannot be identified until the powers positively conferred 
upon the Commonwealth under s 51 are first fully identified. Indeed, this much 
can be accepted, in a sense, even by proponents of the reserved powers theory.112 
Rather, the objective of the testamentary analogy, as first developed by Isaacs J, 
was to adopt a particular theory of the original nature of the Australian federal 
system as a whole. According to Isaacs J’s metaphor, the testator is the Imperial 
Parliament, the primary and positive beneficiary is the Commonwealth, and the 
secondary and residual beneficiaries are the states. On this analogy, the distribu-
tion of power is entirely determined by the testator (the Imperial Parliament), not 
the beneficiaries (the Commonwealth and the states), and certainly not the 
secondary beneficiaries (the states). On this view, the decision to confer positive 
grants upon the Commonwealth was to accord primacy to federal power and to 
treat state powers as secondary and indefinite.113 
Ironically, while the Engineers’ Case was not directly concerned with the 
reserved powers doctrine or with the residuary theory of state power, it is this 
aspect of the judgment that has proved the most resilient.114 Indeed, the priority 
to be given to the interpretation of federal legislative power became so well 
entrenched that it was fundamental even in those cases, such as Melbourne 
Corporation,115 that challenged other aspects of received Engineers’ doctrine.116 
The principle has been invoked in virtually every major case in which the scope 
of the Commonwealth’s legislative powers has been at issue, including the 
relatively modest number of cases that have considered the scope of the corpora-
tions power.117 Time and again, the Court has turned to the Engineers’ Case for 
the requisite inspiration on questions such as these.118 When understood merely 
as a methodological proposition, the residuary theory can be consistent with 
reading federal heads of power in either narrow or liberal terms. But when 
understood by reference to the testamentary analogy, it means that federal heads 
of legislative power are to be interpreted ‘with all the generality which the words 
used admit.’119 The result has been a gradual, but seemingly inevitable, expan-
 
112 Thus, even Griffith CJ himself referred to the powers of the states as being residual in nature: 
see Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585, 605–6. 
113 For a critique of the testamentary analogy that emphasises the interpretive problems with it, see 
Sawer, above n 97, 199–200. 
114 Zines in The High Court and the Constitution, above n 80, 12, observes: ‘On the question of the 
reserved powers doctrine, there has been general agreement that it is wrong to interpret Com-
monwealth powers on the basis that s 107 has left domestic matters to the States.’ 
115 (1947) 74 CLR 31. 
116 Ibid 78–9 (Dixon J). The Engineers’ Case was similarly relied upon in Australian Capital 
Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 133–4 (Mason CJ). 
117 See, eg, Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 468, 485, 488–9 (Barwick CJ) 
(‘Concrete Pipes Case’), a case that Zines compares to the Engineers’ Case in significance, 
arguing that it was ‘the first big breakthrough in federal power in 50 years’: Zines, ‘Changing 
Attitudes to Federalism’, above n 80, 92. 
118 See, eg, Payroll Tax Case (1971) 122 CLR 353, 396 (Windeyer J); Concrete Pipes Case (1971) 
124 CLR 468, 485, 488–9 (Barwick CJ); Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 128 (Ma-
son J); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 44–5 (Brennan J). 
119 Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 492 (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), citing and adopting R v Public Vehicles 
Licensing Appeal Tribunal of Tasmania; Ex parte Australian National Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 
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sion in the recognised scope of Commonwealth legislative power.120 The Work 
Choices Case is, in this sense, only the most recent of a long line of cases in 
which the potential of the Engineers’ principle has gradually unfolded. 
However, the progressive unfolding of the implications of the residuary theory 
of state power has not been without its discontents. While all judges since the 
Engineers’ Case have had to avoid any explicit reliance upon reserved powers 
reasoning, elements of the doctrine have surfaced from time to time. There have 
been two principal ways in which this has occurred. The first has been mainly 
interpretive in orientation, where, in certain cases, it has been observed that 
multiple interpretations of federal heads of power are possible, some tending to 
favour the Commonwealth, others tending to favour the states. In this context, it 
has sometimes been emphasised that the Constitution very evidently provides for 
a federal system and anticipates that the states will not only continue to exist, but 
will continue to function as independent governments possessing significant 
powers.121 As Latham CJ put it, ‘no single power should be construed in such a 
way as to give to the Commonwealth Parliament a universal power of legislation 
which would render absurd the assignment of particular carefully defined powers 
to that Parliament.’122 In these cases, it has then been concluded that a ‘balance’ 
needs to be maintained between the powers of the Commonwealth and the states, 
and that the Court should prefer the narrower interpretation of federal power 
where available.123 Sometimes this argument has been proposed in absolute 
 
113 CLR 207, 225 (Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ). Cf Jumbunna 
Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’ Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 367–8 (O’Connor J) 
(‘Jumbunna Coal Mine’); Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 
29, 81 (Dixon J) (‘ANA Case’); Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 
298 (Starke J), 332 (Dixon J) (‘Bank Nationalisation Case’). 
120 Winterton, ‘The High Court and Federalism’, above n 52, 204. Virtually all commentators agree 
— whether they like it or not — that the general trend of constitutional interpretation over the 
last eight decades has been one of gradual expansion of Commonwealth power at the expense of 
that of the states. Moreover, they agree that what has driven this trend, so far as constitutional 
jurisprudence is concerned, has been a combination of particular interpretive methodologies and, 
in at least some instances, an underlying sympathy for the exercise of national power: see, eg, 
Lumb, ‘Problems of Characterization’, above n 110; Lumb, ‘The Franklin Dam Decision’, 
above n 110; Sir Daryl Dawson, ‘Southey Memorial Lecture 1983: The Constitution — Major 
Overhaul or Simple Tune-Up?’ (1984) 14 Melbourne University Law Review 353; Leslie Zines, 
‘Characterisation of Commonwealth Laws’ in H P Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian 
Constitutional Perspectives (1992) 33; Gregory Craven, ‘The States — Decline, Fall or What?’ 
in Gregory Craven (ed), Australian Federation: Towards the Second Century (1992) 49; Harry 
Gibbs, ‘The Decline of Federalism?’ (1994) 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 1; Leslie 
Zines, ‘Engineers and the “Federal Balance”’ in Michael Coper and George Williams (eds), 
How Many Cheers for Engineers? (1997) 81; Walker, above n 97; Zines, ‘Changing Attitudes to 
Federalism’, above n 80. 
121 See, eg, Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales [No 2] (1965) 113 CLR 54, 
113–5 (Kitto J). 
122 Bank Nationalisation Case (1948) 76 CLR 1, 184–5 (Latham CJ). See also R v Foster; Ex parte 
Rural Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 43, 83 (Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon, McTiernan, 
Williams and Webb JJ). 
123 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 198–9 (Gibbs CJ) (citations omitted):  
Of course it has been established, since the Engineers’ Case, that it is an error to read s 107 of 
the Constitution, which continues the powers of the Parliaments of the States, ‘as reserving 
any power from the Commonwealth that falls fairly within the explicit terms of an express 
grant in sec 51, as that grant is reasonably construed, unless that reservation is as explicitly 
stated.’ However, in determining the meaning and scope of a power conferred by s 51 it is 
necessary to have regard to the federal nature of the Constitution. 
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terms and a definite content to the federal balance has been invoked.124 At other 
times it has been posed in more interpretive terms.125 A number of High Court 
justices have been attracted to arguments of this general kind, notwithstanding 
the affinity of these arguments with certain aspects of the reserved powers 
doctrine. Over the long term, however, the residuary theory of state power has 
tended to prevail, and federal balance arguments have often been castigated as 
‘ritual invocations’126 that would resuscitate the ‘ghosts’127 of the reserved 
powers doctrine. Heads of power that have been interpreted in relatively narrow 
terms are the exception, not the rule.128 
The second route through which elements of reserved powers reasoning have 
entered judgments of the Court is where limitations written into a particular head 
of power have been read as implying limitations on the scope of other heads of 
power. The most orthodox version of this approach is where the limitations in 
view are expressed in explicit, negative terms. Sections 51(xiii), (xiv) and (xxxi) 
of the Constitution provide the clearest examples here.129 The power in s 51(xiii) 
to legislate with respect to ‘banking, other than State banking’130 contains an 
explicit negative prohibition that is capable of two different interpretations: one 
in which the prohibition is read as limiting only the paragraph in which it is 
found; and another in which it is read as limiting the scope of other heads of 
power. Against the general trend in interpretation following the Engineers’ Case, 
s 51(xiii) has been interpreted to mean that the Commonwealth is not able to 
legislate on the subject of state banking, not only under s 51(xiii), but also under 
any other heads of power.131 Similarly, the power in s 51(xxxi) to legislate with 
respect to ‘the acquisition of property on just terms’ has been interpreted to mean 
that other heads of power cannot support legislation that involves an acquisition 
of property not on just terms,132 unless such an acquisition is an essential aspect 
of the very subject matter of the power or is something closely incidental to it, 
such as the taxation of money, the payment of fines for breaches of law, the 
sequestration of the assets of someone declared bankrupt or the confiscation of 
 
124 Lumb, ‘Problems of Characterization’, above n 110, 48; Lumb, ‘The Franklin Dam Decision’, 
above n 110, 140. 
125 Winterton, ‘The High Court and Federalism’, above n 52, 206–10. 
126 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 129 (Mason J). 
127 A-G (WA) ex rel Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian National Airlines 
Commission (1976) 138 CLR 492, 530 (Murphy J). 
128 The best example of this is the power in s 51(i) of the Constitution with respect to interstate 
trade and commerce, which has received a relatively narrow interpretation compared with that 
given to the equivalent power under the United States Constitution — see the discussion in 
Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 80, 55–79.  
129 See also Constitution ss 51(ii) (the taxation power), (xxiiiA) (the medical and dental services 
power). 
130 See also Constitution s 51(xiii) (the power to legislate with respect to ‘[i]nsurance, other than 
State insurance’). 
131 Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales (1990) 170 CLR 276, 285–6 (Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
132 W H Blakeley & Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1953) 87 CLR 501, 521 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, 
Williams, Webb, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ); Re Döhnert Müller Schmidt & Co; A-G 
(Cth) v Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361, 371–2 (Dixon CJ) (‘Schmidt’); Clunies-Ross v Common-
wealth (1984) 155 CLR 193, 201–2 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Daw-
son JJ). 
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prohibited imports.133 It is remarkable that, despite involving elements of 
reserved powers reasoning, there have been no allegations of heresy in relation to 
this particular interpretive strategy, especially when it is noted that s 51(xxxi) 
does not contain an explicit negative prohibition but merely stipulates that 
acquisitions under the placitum must be ‘on just terms’.  
Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed that inter-provisional interpretations of 
this kind are the exception, not the rule. Thus, for example, a majority of the 
Court has refused to read down the marriage power in s 51(xxi) in light of the 
limited terms of the divorce and custody power in s 51(xxii),134 and the Court 
has likewise refused to read down the defence power in s 51(vi) by reference to 
the industrial arbitration power in s 51(xxxv).135 
V  CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 
The specific conclusions arrived at by the majority and the minority in the 
Work Choices Case can be traced ultimately to different approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation. The majority’s reasoning recapitulates the succession of 
fundamental constitutional choices which the High Court has made in the cases 
decided since the Engineers’ Case, while the reasoning in the dissenting judg-
ments sets forth a series of alternative choices which hark back to the reserved 
powers doctrine, but without acknowledgement as such. By showing how the 
majority’s decision replicates the choices that have become the orthodox 
approach and how the minority proposes an alternative, heterodox set of 
interpretations and doctrines, it is possible to explain much of the paradoxical 
character of the case in both its revolutionary and conventional dimensions. 
A  The Majority 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ insisted very early in 
their joint judgment that the Court must adhere to ‘the accepted principles of 
constitutional interpretation’.136 Invoking the Engineers’ Case on numerous 
occasions,137 they affirmed that the ‘starting point’ in interpretation must be the 
‘constitutional text’, rather than a view ‘formed independently of that text’.138 
This fundamental interpretive choice, to consider solely the text and not some-
thing independent of the text, entailed a number of things. First, it meant that the 
Constitution is not to be interpreted in light of the understandings or expectations 
of the framers. Denouncing attempts to divine the founders’ intentions as the 
 
133 Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Clyne (1958) 100 CLR 246; Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361; 
Burton v Honan (1952) 86 CLR 169; Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 179 
CLR 155. 
134 See generally Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495.  
135 See generally Pidoto v Victoria (1943) 68 CLR 87, discussed in the Work Choices Case (2006) 
229 CLR 1, 128–31 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
136 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 71. See also at 71–2, 97. 
137 Ibid 71, 73, 118, 119. 
138 Ibid 118–19. See also at 89, 119, 121. 
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pursuit of ‘a mirage’,139 the majority maintained that even if such a ‘collective 
subjective intention’ could be ascertained it would divert attention from the real 
objective, which is to interpret the text ‘in accordance with accepted princi-
ples.’140 Secondly, it meant that the Constitution is not to be interpreted by 
reference to ideas about ‘the place to be accorded to the States formed independ-
ently of the text of the Constitution.’141 Here, in particular, the majority justices 
took clear aim at both the reserved powers doctrine and the idea of federal 
balance. They suggested that the plaintiffs erroneously took as their assumption a 
‘particular division of governmental or legislative power’142 — the idea that the 
Constitution preserves some kind of ‘static equilibrium’ captured in the phrase 
‘federal balance’143 — and that their submissions contained ‘[m]ore than faint 
echoes’ of reserved powers reasoning.144 Conversely, the majority insisted that 
the Court construe the text ‘with all the generality which the words used ad-
mit’,145 and when they said this (on several occasions) it seems quite clear that 
they had especially the text of s 51(xx) — and not the text of s 51(xxxv) or s 107 
— in mind. In other words, this emphasis on the ‘text’ meant giving the particu-
lar words of s 51(xx) their widest possible meaning, without taking into consid-
eration in any significant sense any other provisions contained within the 
Constitution. The language of s 51(xx), interpreted in isolation from other heads 
of power, was to be decisive. 
Consistent with this approach, the majority addressed the issues raised in the 
Work Choices Case in a precise and narrowly-defined manner. In particular, the 
 
139 Ibid 97. The majority thought that the various approaches to the scope of the corporations power 
revealed in Huddart Parker showed that there was no settled understanding of the meaning of 
s 51(xx) of the Constitution among Griffith CJ, Barton, O’Connor, Isaacs and Higgins JJ, all of 
them framers of the Constitution: at 84–5. They also thought that the convention debates reveal 
very little, other than a deliberate intention to expand the scope of the power from one con-
cerned narrowly with the status and recognition of corporations (in 1891) to one concerned also 
with ‘the general subject’ of the specified kinds of corporations, extending to the regulation of 
the mode in which they conduct their business (in 1897): at 94–7. They cited the Sydney Na-
tional Debates, 3 April 1891, above n 24, 686 (Sir Samuel Griffith, James Munro, Sir John 
Bray); Adelaide Debates, 12 April 1897, above n 24, 439 (Edmund Barton). 
140 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 97. See also at 71–2, 103–4. Appealing to the repeated 
failure of proposed amendments to the Constitution in order to give the Commonwealth a gen-
eral power over industrial relations was said to suffer from insuperable difficulties. First, it 
assumed an analogy between the failed amendment proposals and the law under consideration in 
the current case. Secondly, it assumed that the failure of a referendum represents an intelligible 
choice made by properly informed electors between clearly identified constitutional alternatives. 
Thirdly, it failed to explain exactly what implications for the meaning of the Constitution are to 
be derived from the failure of a referendum proposal and it overlooks the fact that the Constitu-
tion makes it the responsibility of the High Court to determine the interpretation of the Constitu-
tion: at 100–1. 
141 Ibid 119. See generally at 118–20. 
142 Ibid 72. 
143 Ibid 73. See also at 116 (‘an implicit assertion about federal balance’), 118 (‘explicitly or 
implicitly invoked notions of federal balance’), 120 (‘appeals made to notions of federal bal-
ance, no matter whether the appeal was explicit or only implicit’) with respect to the plaintiffs’ 
arguments. 
144 Ibid 85. See also at 89, 97. 
145 Ibid 103–4, 117, citing R v Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal of Tasmania; Ex parte 
Australian National Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207, 225–6 (Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor, 
Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ); Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 
202 CLR 479, 492 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
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criteria proposed by the plaintiffs for their preferred narrow reading of the 
corporations power were closely scrutinised. The implication — consistent with 
the thrust of the Engineers’ Case — seems to be that to read federal heads of 
power narrowly is to introduce too many fine judgements about where the line is 
to be drawn, which in turn leads to subjectivity and uncertainty.146 Thus, the 
proposed distinction between the internal affairs and external relations of 
corporations was criticised for its ‘inherent instability’,147 and the suggestion that 
the Court should adopt the distinctive character test was said to produce ‘awk-
ward results.’148 
But how devastating are these claims when closely scrutinised? Upon careful 
examination, the alleged instability and awkwardness of the tests actually tend to 
evaporate. What is left behind is not much more than the underlying premise of 
the entire judgment, namely, an outright rejection of reserved powers and federal 
balancing reasoning and a simple preference for reading federal heads of power 
as widely as their language can conceivably sustain. 
Initially, the supposed instability of the internal–external distinction is said by 
the majority to flow from the practical difficulty in classifying certain kinds of 
corporate activities as either internal or external.149 However, in the very next 
paragraph of the judgment the distinction is admitted to have at least some 
‘utility’ in the resolution of issues relating to choice of law questions when 
corporations are involved.150 If the distinction has utility in this context, then 
presumably it is a workable distinction. But if it is a workable distinction in the 
context of choice of law questions, why is it unstable in the context of questions 
relating to the distribution of power? The answer given to this question is 
revealing. It does not involve some careful explanation about how a particular 
distinction could be stable and workable in one context but not in another, but 
rather turns on the proposition that choice of law and distribution of power 
questions involve ‘radically different’ inquiries.151 The former, it is said, assumes 
that the two potentially applicable bodies of law emanate from jurisdictions 
whose legal competence to enact the laws is undoubted, whereas in the latter 
context it is said that the competence of the jurisdictions to make the law is the 
very point in question.152 Thus, in the first situation considerations of ‘comity’ 
between jurisdictions have a legitimate place, but not so — the joint judgment 
 
146 See Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 135 (arguments of Sir Edward Mitchell and John 
Latham for Victoria), 142 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). 
147 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 87. See further criticism at 121. 
148 Ibid 104, 112. 
149 Ibid 87, where the majority asked how activities such as an offer of shares to existing sharehold-
ers, raising capital through a public offering of shares and borrowing from a bank were to be 
classified. The first certainly appears to be internal, and the third external, but what of the sec-
ond? The majority presented the difficulty inherent in classifying such an activity as a reason to 
reject the internal–external distinction. 
150 Ibid 87–8, where examples of its application to choice of law questions relating to corporations 
are discussed. The majority cited the following cases in its discussion: Bateman v Service (1881) 
6 App Cas 386; Chaff and Hay Acquisition Committee v J A Hemphill & Sons Pty Ltd (1947) 74 
CLR 375. 
151 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 88. 
152 Ibid 89. 
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asserts — in the second.153 But why? No answer to this question is given, except 
that it is illegitimate to apply considerations of comity as a ground for reading 
the corporations power narrowly because it invokes ‘presuppositions about 
allocation of legislative power between the integers of the federation that are not 
easily distinguished from the reserved powers doctrine.’154 In this way, while the 
argument against the internal–external distinction begins as a claim about its 
inherent instability, the argument itself collapses when it is recognised that the 
distinction does have some utility in choice of law cases, leaving only a bare 
objection to reserved powers and federal balance reasoning in its stead. 
Essentially, the same thing happens in the majority’s critique of the distinctive 
character test. Awkward results are said to transpire because the test requires the 
Court to focus upon ‘activities’ in relation to trading and financial corporations, 
but upon the question of ‘status’ in relation to foreign corporations.155 The 
supposed awkwardness consists in the resulting ‘disconformity’ between the 
ambit of the Commonwealth’s power with respect to trading and financial 
corporations and its power with respect to foreign corporations.156 But surely the 
textual answer to this criticism is obvious: the qualifying adjectives ‘trading’ and 
‘financial’ actually refer to activities, while the adjective ‘foreign’ refers to the 
source or origin from which a corporation derives its corporate status. Taking 
these adjectives seriously requires us to focus upon activities in relation to two of 
the classes of corporation and status in respect of the third.157 Why, then, is there 
any awkwardness in different kinds of considerations being applied if the 
language of s 51(xx), as interpreted, seems to require it? Surely it cannot be 
because we are concerned with but one placitum of s 51, and that the same kind 
of test must be applied in all instances? After all, we are certainly accustomed to 
this phenomenon arising in the interpretation of other provisions of the Constitu-




155 Ibid 104. 
156 Ibid 112. 
157 This is the case whether the relevant activities are those described in the corporation’s constitu-
tion or those actually engaged in by the corporation. But compare the different approaches in 
R v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Western Australian National Football 
League (Inc) (1979) 143 CLR 190, 208–11 (Barwick CJ), 213 (Gibbs J), 217–21 (Stephen J), 
232–7 (Mason J), 237 (Jacobs J), 238–40 (Murphy J), 240–1 (Aickin J); State Superannuation 
Board v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 150 CLR 282, 294–6 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 
303–6 (Mason, Murphy and Deane JJ); Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, 586–90 
(Gibbs CJ), 600–2 (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ). In applying the object of command 
test, these matters have to be considered for the purpose of identifying the classes of corpora-
tions to which the power relates. On the distinctive character test, they also have to be consid-
ered for the wider purpose of identifying the kinds of laws that can be enacted under the head of 
power. 
158 Thus, the present state of authority on s 92 seems to accept the application of different tests in 
relation to freedom of interstate trade and commerce on one hand, and freedom of interstate 
intercourse on the other. If different treatment produces no ‘awkwardness’ under s 92, why does 
it under s 51(xx)?: see Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 393–4 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Bren-
nan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 
CLR 1, 53–61 (Brennan J), 81–4 (Deane and Toohey JJ); Australian Capital Television Pty 
Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 191–6 (Dawson J); Cunliffe v Commonwealth 
(1994) 182 CLR 272, 366–7 (Dawson J). 
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distinctive character test is that it imposes what is described as an ‘additional 
filter’159 through which federal laws must pass, a requirement which — it is said 
— unavoidably invokes notions of federal balance.160 What is particularly 
objectionable about the test, therefore, is that it delivers a ‘very narrow’ reading 
of the power with respect to foreign corporations,161 together with a moderately 
limited reading of the power over trading and financial corporations. The 
underlying hermeneutical principle that ultimately shapes the majority’s joint 
judgment is not so much the text, therefore, but rather a commitment to reading 
the corporations power as widely as the words used can conceivably allow.162 
The majority’s fundamental objection to the internal–external distinction and 
the distinctive character test is that they rely upon a preconceived ‘federal 
balance’,163 and that it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to articulate some means 
by which the precise contours of that balance can be clearly identified.164 This 
line of reasoning, however, depends upon a characterisation of the plaintiffs’ 
argument as involving an absolute conception of the federal balance, if not also 
an absolute version of the reserved powers doctrine.165 But it is possible, as has 
been seen, to construct federal balance and reserved powers arguments in 
interpretive, rather than absolute, terms. Indeed, the majority implicitly acknowl-
edged that an interpretive version of reserved powers reasoning was at stake 
when recapping the plaintiffs’ submission that s 51(xxxv) provides a powerful 
reason for favouring a relatively narrow construction of s 51(xx).166 
Despite the conclusions of the majority, the corporations power is capable of a 
number of different, plausible interpretations, including the view that the 
character of the corporation as a trading or financial corporation must be 
significant in the way in which the law relates to the corporation.167 It is cer-
tainly true that the application of such a test would unavoidably require addi-
tional, difficult and debatable judgements to be made in specific cases. But the 
so-called ‘object of command’ test is no different in this respect. While it 
eliminates the particular interpretive choices that would have to be made in 
relation to the boundaries marked out by the distinctive character test, the object 
of command test substitutes its own boundary markers. These markers certainly 
carve out a wider territory for the scope of the power, but it is a territory which 
nonetheless has its own limits about which interpretive choices will still have to 
be made. However, the majority’s joint judgment proceeds as if this is not the 
 
159 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 141 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ). 
160 Ibid 104, 115, 121, 139, 141. 
161 Ibid 112. 
162 As Zines in The High Court and the Constitution, above n 80, 93 suggests: ‘the language of the 
provision, in itself, provides no conclusive answer to these conflicting opinions.’ 
163 At several points in its judgment the majority identifies the notion of ‘federal balance’ in the 
plaintiffs’ arguments: Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 73, 116, 118, 120. 
164 Ibid 120. The onus was upon the plaintiffs to answer that question but, according to the majority, 
they entirely failed to do so. 
165 See ibid 71–4. 
166 Ibid 122. 
167 See ibid 112–13. 
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case, and the object of command test is in this sense privileged.168 A choice 
between these two general approaches to the scope of the power has to be made. 
It is not a choice necessitated by the text or by considerations of workability or 
stability of the different tests, but rather one driven ultimately by the question of 
whether a relatively narrow or wider interpretation is to be preferred.169 
B  Interpretive Choices of the Majority 
It was earlier suggested that the decision in the Work Choices Case was the 
predictable outcome of the recapitulation of fundamental constitutional choices 
that have been made since the Engineers’ Case. However, this is not to say that 
the outcome was actually determined by the decided cases. What made the 
outcome predictable was the Court’s longstanding commitment to interpreting 
federal heads of power as widely as their language can conceivably allow. 
However, as was admitted by the majority, there was no decided case which had 
authoritatively determined that the corporations power extended as widely as it 
needed to in order to uphold the Work Choices Act.170 Indeed, the case law 
presented two difficulties for the Commonwealth. First, previous decisions on 
the corporations power left it open for the Court to choose between the distinc-
tive character and object of command tests. Secondly, as has been seen, there 
were several lines of cases in relation to other heads of power which suggested 
that the Court’s rejection of reserved powers reasoning has not been as unquali-
fied as is sometimes thought. 
As to the first point, there is no doubt that, in accordance with Engineers’ 
methodology, the recognised scope of the corporations power has progressively 
expanded in case after case. Generally speaking, the sequence from Huddart 
Parker171 to Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (‘Concrete Pipes Case’),172 
Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd 
(‘Fontana Films’)173 and Commonwealth v Tasmania (‘Tasmanian Dam 
Case’)174 presents a progressive ratcheting up of the recognised scope of the 
power by a majority of the Court. In this context, much of the majority’s 
reasoning in the Work Choices Case was directed to a selective reading down of 
obiter dicta favouring various limited readings of s 51(xx);175 to downplaying the 
 
168 Notice the absence of inverted commas around the words ‘object of command’ in the following 
passage from the joint judgment (ibid 117): ‘Each of the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs 
proffered a form of limit on the reach of s 51(xx): only “external” relationships, “something 
more” than object of command, “distinctive character” or “discriminatory operation”.’ 
169 As the majority admitted, much depended upon the ‘starting point’ of the analysis: ibid 118–19. 
Notably, while the majority presented their position as one founded upon the text, they acknowl-
edged at 119 the famous observation of Windeyer J in the Payroll Tax Case (1971) 122 CLR 
353, 397 that the decision in the Engineers’ Case was made not simply on the basis of some 
neutral reading of the text alone but ‘in response to changing circumstances’. These changing 
circumstances included an emerging ‘sense of national identity’: ibid 119. 
170 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 102. 
171 (1909) 8 CLR 330. 
172 (1971) 124 CLR 468. 
173 (1982) 150 CLR 169. 
174 (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
175 See Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 105, 106 (discussing the Bank Nationalisation Case 
(1948) 76 CLR 1), 107–8 (discussing the Concrete Pipes Case (1971) 124 CLR 468), 111 (dis-
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slim majority decision to strike down the law in Re Dingjan;176 and to emphasis-
ing certain dicta of Gaudron J in Re Dingjan and Re Pacific Coal in which her 
Honour set forth an exceptionally wide view of the scope of the corporations 
power.177 
As to the second point, the problem for the Commonwealth concerned the 
decided cases on the banking, insurance and acquisition powers.178 These cases 
involved reserved powers reasoning to the extent that the reserved powers 
doctrine entailed the proposition that the limited language of one head of power 
may support a limited reading of another. It must be asked why if the doctrine is 
permissible in these cases it is not allowed in relation to the industrial arbitration 
and corporations powers, as was argued by the plaintiffs. To this claim, the 
majority adopted three basic responses. First, they said that provisions such as 
the taxation, banking and insurance powers define the scope of power by 
reference to an unlimited class (for example, ‘banking’) which is then qualified 
by a proviso (for example, ‘other than State banking’) that operates as a ‘positive 
prohibition or restriction’ on federal legislative power generally.179 In contrast, 
the industrial arbitration power is worded simply as a limited class expressed as 
a ‘compound conception’.180 Secondly, and alternatively, provisions such as the 
acquisitions power, although expressed in the form of a compound conception, 
involve an express power that is ‘subject to a safeguard, restriction or qualifica-
tion’ (that is, the just terms requirement in s 51(xxxi)).181 Thirdly, when origi-
nally drafting the industrial arbitration power the framers were not concerned, it 
was said, with the general topic of ‘industrial relations’ but with the resolution by 
particular means of certain kinds of ‘industrial disputes’ and ‘industrial conflict’, 
and for this reason s 51(xxxv) does not necessarily exhaust the Commonwealth’s 
capacity to legislate with respect to industrial relations.182 Arguments based upon 
the text, structure, history and authority of the Constitution were marshalled to 
support each of these three basic contentions.183 
 
cussing Fontana Films (1982) 150 CLR 169), 111 (discussing the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 
158 CLR 1). 
176 See Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 113 (discussing Re Dingjan (1995) 183 CLR 323). 
177 See Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 114–15, where the majority discusses Gaudron J’s 
reasoning in Re Dingjan (1995) 183 CLR 323, 365 and quotes Gaudron J in Re Pacific Coal 
(2000) 203 CLR 346, 375. Gaudron J’s reasoning in Re Pacific Coal is also quoted by the ma-
jority at 121–2. Cf Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 206–7 (Kirby J), 366 (Callinan J). 
178 See Part III above. The issue is discussed in the joint judgment: Work Choices Case (2006) 229 
CLR 1, 123–4. 
179 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 127, citing Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales 
(1990) 170 CLR 276, 285 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ). 
180 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 127–8. As the majority explained, s 51(xxxv) ‘contains 
within it, and not as an exception or reservation upon what otherwise would be its scope, the 
element of interstate disputation’. The somewhat ambiguous reference to the element of inter-
state disputation is possibly too terse, as it is not only the requirement of a dispute extending 
beyond the limits of any one state that is said to constitute an important restriction contained in 
s 51(xxxv) but also the requirement that the dispute be resolved by processes of conciliation and 
arbitration. 
181 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 123–4, quoting Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361, 371–2 
(Dixon CJ). 
182 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 71–2. 
183 Ibid 124–34. 
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There are serious problems with each of these responses. As to the distinction 
between an unlimited class qualified by a proviso and a limited class expressed 
as a compound conception, there are two difficulties. First, as Julius Stone 
pointed out many years ago, to depend upon the difference between a limited 
class and an unlimited class qualified by a proviso is to depend upon a category 
of meaningless reference.184 Stone acknowledged that in some instances a 
legislating body may intend that the different way of defining the field of 
operation is to have additional implications beyond simply defining the class, but 
the strictly logical import of the two drafting techniques is indistinguishable. To 
suggest that a difference is implied (in either direction) requires additional 
evidence and argument. An argument based upon the bare text alone is at best 
inconclusive, if not altogether illusory. 
Secondly, based on the text alone, it is quite open to conclude that the limita-
tions written into ss 51(ii), (iii), (xiii), (xiv) and (xxiiiA) apply only to each of 
those provisions individually and have no application beyond them. And yet, the 
High Court has held that those qualifications limit the scope of other heads of 
power. This was an interpretive choice that, again, needs to be supported by 
reasons either way. But if an exception could be made in respect of these heads 
of power, why not also in respect of s 51(xxxv)? In deciding that s 51(xxxv) does 
not imply a prohibition, an interpretive choice was being made, for the text 
leaves the question open. However, the majority’s judgment treated the matter as 
if it was determinable by reference almost wholly to textual considerations and 
they did not canvass positive evidence that the framers of the Constitution may 
have intended the limiting words they used to have an implied prohibitive 
effect.185 
As to the argument that the acquisition power of s 51(xxxi) is explicitly quali-
fied by ‘a safeguard, restriction or qualification’, there are two further difficul-
ties. First, the power is clearly expressed in the form of a compound concep-
tion.186 Secondly, the idea that ‘just terms’ constitutes ‘a safeguard, restriction or 
qualification’ depends on considerations quite independent of the text alone, and 
which are hardly referable to anything explicitly said during the very brief 
discussion that the provision received during the convention debates.187 To read 
the just terms requirement as a fundamental safeguard that limits not only the 
acquisition power but the scope of other powers is to draw on considerations of 
constitutional principle and theory quite extrinsic to the text of the Constitution 
itself. Even if such a conclusion can be drawn with respect to the just terms 
requirement of s 51(xxxi), why can it not also be drawn in respect to the refer-
 
184 Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (1965) 241–5. 
185 See below n 191 and accompanying text. In the Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 131–4, 
the joint judgment discussed certain limited aspects of the convention debates with a view to 
underscoring the undetermined nature of the idea of industrial conciliation and arbitration. 
186 Grace Brothers Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1946) 72 CLR 269, 290 (Dixon J); Mutual Pools & 
Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 179 CLR 155, 219–20 (McHugh J). Both of these cases 
were cited with approval in Airservices Australia v Canadian Airlines International Ltd (2000) 
202 CLR 133, 250, 252 (McHugh J), 295–6 (Gummow J), 304, 311 (Callinan J). 
187 See Rosalind Dixon, ‘Overriding Guarantee of Just Terms or Supplementary Source of Power?: 
Rethinking s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution’ (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 639, 655–7. 
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ence in s 51(xxxv) to the resolution of interstate industrial disputes by processes 
of conciliation and arbitration, as Kirby J maintained?188 
Finally, the majority’s reasoning about the scope and relevance of the indus-
trial arbitration power depends upon a selective reading of the context in which 
the provision was drafted. It is true enough, as the majority pointed out, that the 
provision was drafted in the context of pressing concerns about the problem of 
industrial disputation and conflict.189 It may also be conceded that s 51(xxxv) 
does not represent the only place in the Constitution in which a capacity to deal 
with such conflict can be found.190 However, the evidence also suggests that the 
power conferred in s 51(xxxv) was, in fact, the only power that the framers were 
prepared to grant to the Commonwealth in the general field of industrial 
relations.191 While it is therefore possible to interpret the industrial arbitration 
power as concerned only with the narrow problem of industrial conflict, leaving 
open the possibility that other heads of power may be used to regulate industrial 
matters more generally, it is also possible to interpret it as exhausting that field. 
In other words, once again, the Court was faced with an interpretive choice. The 
text did not necessitate one interpretation over another. 
This is not to suggest that it is clear that the limitations written into one head of 
power must always cut down the scope of other heads of power. To take this to 
its logical conclusion would lead to an absurd, lowest common denominator 
outcome — indeed, there have been important cases in which such outcomes 
have been consciously rejected. However, it does suggest that there are interpre-
tative choices to be made. The weaknesses in the majority’s responses to the 
plaintiffs’ arguments demonstrate that it was a prior commitment to reading 
Commonwealth heads of power as widely as possible, rather than the force of the 
majority’s responses, that was determinative. 
C  Callinan J 
It has been suggested that the result in the Work Choices Case was in a certain 
sense the predictable outcome of the application of well-established methods of 
constitutional interpretation and construction of federal legislative power. In this 
context, Callinan J’s dissenting judgment could have pursued one of two 
 
188 See Part V(D) below. 
189 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 124–5. 
190 See ibid 125–6, discussing ss 51(vi) (the defence power) and 119 (the protection of the states 
from invasion and violence). 
191 See Sydney National Debates, 3 April 1891, above n 24, 688–9 (Charles Cameron Kingston, Sir 
Samuel Griffith); Sydney National Debates, 6 April 1891, above n 24, 780–5 (Charles Cameron 
Kingston, Sir Samuel Griffith, Alfred Deakin, Duncan Gillies, Thomas Playford, George Dibbs); 
Adelaide Debates, 17 April 1897, above n 24, 782–93 (Graham Higgins, Charles Cameron 
Kingston, Sir George Turner, Edward McMillan, Sir John Downer, James Howe, Joseph Car-
ruthers, Alfred Deakin, Simon Fraser, Josiah Symon, Bernhard Wise, Sir Edward Braddon, 
Edmund Barton); Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Mel-
bourne, 25–7 January 1898, 180–215 (Graham Higgins, Edward McMillan, Sir John Downer, 
Charles Cameron Kingston, Patrick Glynn, Edmund Barton, John Quick, Sir William Zeal, Isaac 
Isaacs, William Lyne, John Cockburn, Alfred Deakin, Josiah Symon, Henry Dobson, Bernhard 
Wise, Sir Walter James, Sir Joseph Abbott, William Trenwith, Richard O’Connor, James Howe, 
Frederick Holder, Alexander Peacock, George Leake, George Reid, Sir John Forrest, Sir George 
Turner, Sir Edward Braddon). 
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strategies. The first was to criticise those methods of interpretation and to 
propose a set of alternatives. The second was to work within the established 
methods and to show how, in their application to the decided cases, it remained 
possible to come to the conclusion that the Work Choices Act was at least in part 
unconstitutional. In fact, Callinan J followed both paths. 
Callinan J’s judgment was composed on a large and ambitious canvas. Sepa-
rate sections of the judgment dealt, in turn, with the intended operation and reach 
of the new Work Choices laws, the long-assumed limits of the Commonwealth’s 
industrial powers (and attempts by constitutional amendment to overcome them), 
appropriate methods of constitutional interpretation, the constitutional imperative 
of maintaining a balance of power between the Commonwealth and the states, 
and the need to interpret the Constitution as an entire document. The judgment 
then turned to a close examination of the reach of the industrial arbitration and 
corporations powers and concluded by drawing out the implications for the 
specific provisions of the Work Choices Act. 
Of strategic importance was Callinan J’s denial that there is, in fact, any con-
sistently applied method of constitutional interpretation evident in the judgments 
of the High Court through the course of its history.192 Against the insistence by 
the majority that the Constitution ought to be interpreted in accordance with 
‘accepted principles’,193 Callinan J denied that any such principles exist.194 Some 
judges, he pointed out, have said that the Constitution should be interpreted 
textually, others by reference to history, and yet others by reference to purpose, 
original intent, contemporary needs, context, structure, and so on, in all sorts of 
combinations.195 Accordingly, despite ‘unedifying accusations of “heresy”’,196 
Callinan J flatly countered that ‘no judge can claim to stride the high ground of 
exclusive interpretative orthodoxy.’197 While he certainly acknowledged the 
importance and authority of the Engineers’ Case,198 he just as readily declared 
the decision to be ‘an early instance of judicial activism,’199 which ‘does not 
deserve the reverence which has been accorded to it.’200 Indeed, its reasoning, he 
said, is ‘less than satisfactory’:201 in certain respects it is simply ‘not convinc-
ing’202 and in others it has been subjected to necessary revision203 and certain 
qualifications.204 
 
192 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 301–5. 
193 Ibid 71 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
194 Ibid 308. 
195 Ibid 301–3. 
196 Ibid 303 (citations omitted). 
197 Ibid 304. Callinan J cited Gummow J in SGH Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 
210 CLR 51, 75: 
Questions of construction of the Constitution are not to be answered by the adoption and ap-
plication of any particular, all-embracing and revelatory theory or doctrine of interpretation. 
Nor are they answered by the resolution of a perceived conflict between rival theories, with 
the placing of the victorious theory upon a high ground occupied by the modern, the enlight-
ened and the elect. 
198 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 272, 350. 
199 Ibid 369. 
200 Ibid 308. 
201 Ibid 305. 
202 Ibid 307. 
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It was not enough, however, simply to criticise the Engineers’ Case and to 
point to the disordered condition of Australian constitutional jurisprudence. It 
was also necessary for Callinan J to describe the method of interpretation that the 
Court ought to adopt. Against the textual literalism ostensibly adopted by the 
majority, Callinan J argued for a method that combined a type of objective 
intentionalism with an inter-provisional structuralism. According to his Honour, 
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution ought to be informed by an 
objective ascertainment of the drafters’ intentions by reference to the structure 
of the document, the interrelationship of the parts and sections of it with one 
another, in the setting in which it was drawn, on the basis of the assumptions 
underlying it, and the manifest purposes to which it was to give effect, rele-
vantly here a new nation comprising a federation in which the States would not 
be deprived of powers they formerly possessed, except as identified.205 
These principles in turn implied a particular approach to the interpretation of 
federal heads of legislative power.206 Callinan J had to acknowledge the numer-
ous times in previous cases when it had been said that federal powers are to be 
interpreted ‘with all the generality which the words used admit’,207 rather than 
‘in any narrow or pedantic manner’.208 However, he traced the principle to an 
oft-quoted dictum of O’Connor J in Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal 
Miners’ Association (‘Jumbunna Coal Mine’), in which his Honour had stated: 
where it becomes a question of construing words used in conferring a power of 
that kind on the Commonwealth Parliament, it must always be remembered that 
we are interpreting a Constitution broad and general in its terms, intended to 
apply to the varying conditions which the development of our community must 
involve. 
For that reason, where the question is whether the Constitution has used an ex-
pression in the wider or in the narrower sense, the Court should, in my opinion, 
always lean to the broader interpretation unless there is something in the con-
 
203 Ibid 307–8. 
204 Ibid 272. Among these qualifications, Callinan J pointed in particular to the reasoning in 
Melbourne Corporation and Austin v Commonwealth. One of the weakest aspects of Callinan J’s 
judgment is the argument that these cases call for a narrow reading of the scope of federal heads 
of power: at 362–3, 369, 374. It is true that both cases are generally concerned with the balance 
of power between the Commonwealth and the states, and that they involve an important qualifi-
cation on the reasoning in the Engineers’ Case. However, the reasoning of Latham CJ aside, 
those cases are limited to the existence and continuing functioning of the states as independent 
governments and do not extend to any question about their essential legislative powers. 
205 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 335. 
206 See ibid 318–19. 
207 Ibid 316, citing: R v Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal of Tasmania; Ex parte 
Australian National Airways Pty Ltd (1964) 113 CLR 207, 225–6 (Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor, 
Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ); New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 
470–1 (Mason J) (‘Seas and Submerged Lands Case’); Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 
127–8 (Mason J); Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 528 (Mason CJ); Grain 
Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 492 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
208 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 316, citing: James v Commonwealth (1936) 55 CLR 1, 
43 (Lord Wright); R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 
278 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ) (‘Boilermakers’ Case’); Concrete Pipes Case 
(1971) 124 CLR 468, 490 (Barwick CJ); Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 
223–4 (Mason J). 
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text or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation 
will best carry out its object and purpose.209 
O’Connor J here recognised the interpretive choices that the language of the 
Constitution unavoidably presents, and he appealed to the wider purposes and 
structural features of the Constitution for guidance in making those choices. 
Given that the Constitution contains language that is ‘broad and general’210 and 
intended to apply to changing conditions of the future, the rule of thumb is that 
the Court should lean to the broader interpretation. However, in certain respects 
the manifest purposes or overarching structures of the Constitution may indicate 
that the narrower interpretation is to be preferred. 
According to Callinan J, the framers’ central objective was to create a federal 
system that would maintain a kind of balance between the Commonwealth and 
the states, and to preserve this balance it is necessary to read the various heads of 
power in s 51 together, as a coordinated whole.211 Prominent in his Honour’s 
reasoning, therefore, was this idea of federal balance. Did this idea entail a 
preconceived, static equilibrium as the majority suggested,212 or rather a general 
orientation to be adopted by the Court in the face of the interpretive choices with 
which it is confronted? There is much in Callinan J’s judgment to suggest that 
his approach was interpretive, rather than absolutist. For example, when rebut-
ting the proposition that some virulent strain of reserved powers thinking 
infected the entire reasoning of cases such as Huddart Parker, Callinan J cited 
the following passage from O’Connor J’s judgment in that case: 
Where [the Constitution] confers a power in terms equally capable of a wide 
and of a restricted meaning, that meaning will be adopted which will best give 
effect to the system of distribution of powers between State and Common-
wealth which the Constitution has adopted, and which is most in harmony with 
the general scheme of its structure.213 
In this passage, there is a clear recognition that the boundaries between Com-
monwealth and state power must ultimately be drawn by the Court and that 
interpretive choices cannot be avoided.214 As O’Connor J put it, the task of the 
Court is to adopt that meaning that is most in harmony with and will best give 
effect to the Constitution’s fundamental structures and underlying purposes. 
According to Callinan J, the nature of the relationship between the Common-
wealth and the states is best understood as one of ‘comity’, by which is meant a 
certain ‘mutual respect and deference in allocated areas.’215 Mutual respect and 
deference here meant that the Court should be vigilant to ensure that the states 
are not reduced to mere ‘facades of power’.216 
 
209 (1908) 6 CLR 309, 367–8 (O’Connor J), cited in Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 317. 
210 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 317, citing Jumbunna Coal Mine (1908) 6 CLR 309, 
367–8 (O’Connor J). 
211 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 333. 
212 Ibid 73 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
213 Ibid 317–8 (Callinan J), citing Huddart Parker (1909) 8 CLR 330, 369. 
214 See Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 321. 
215 Ibid 322. 
216 Ibid 328. Callinan J considered that one of the fundamental objectives of the Constitution is the 
preservation and maintenance not only of the states in their bare existence, but also of their 
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Having said this, at times Callinan J also appeared to propound an absolute 
conception of what he sometimes referred to as ‘the federal balance’.217 Thus, his 
Honour considered that federal legislation would distort that balance if it were 
allowed to intrude into the ‘industrial and commercial affairs’218 and other 
‘essential functions’ of the states.219 He discussed an ‘implied negative restric-
tion imposed by s 51(xxxv)’,220 and said that the industrial arbitration power not 
only ‘cast[s] a shadow over other placita of s 51 … [but also] operates to deny 
their application to industrial affairs’.221 This is nothing if it is not reserved 
powers reasoning, couched in apparently absolute terms.222 
The critical point in his judgment came, however, when Callinan J turned to 
the proposition that the limited scope of the industrial arbitration power provides 
reason to construe the corporations power relatively narrowly. The point was 
critical because this line of reasoning served to give substance to the idea of 
federal balance and some specific guidance as to what the content of the exclu-
sive powers of the states might be. Early in his judgment, his Honour had 
demonstrated that when turning their minds to the general question of federal 
legislative competence with respect to industrial matters, the framers adopted the 
deliberately limited language of the industrial arbitration power.223 Callinan J 
then showed that this conception of a relatively limited power of the Common-
wealth over industrial matters had been the prevailing view in the cases, among 
commentators and in political practice generally,224 and that this had in turn led 
 
powers. This contradicted the lesson the majority sought to derive from Dixon J’s observation in 
Melbourne Corporation (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82 that the existence of the states is conceptually 
separable from their powers: ibid 120 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
See also ibid 322–30 (Callinan J), citing South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373, 
442 (Starke J); R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Victoria 
(1942) 66 CLR 488, 515 (Starke J); Melbourne Corporation (1947) 74 CLR 31, 66 (Rich J), 70 
(Starke J), 78–9, 82 (Dixon J), 99 (Williams J); Payroll Tax Case (1971) 122 CLR 353, 424–5 
(Gibbs J); Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192, 205–6 
(Gibbs CJ), 217 (Mason J), 222 (Wilson J), 248 (Deane J), 260 (Dawson J); Aus-
tin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185, 217 (Gleeson CJ), 249 (Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ), 281–2 (McHugh J), 301 (Kirby J); Boilermakers’ Case (1956) 94 CLR 254, 267, 275 
(Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 
217 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 332. Callinan J explains his conception of this term at 
332–3. 
218 Ibid 333. 
219 Ibid 385. 
220 Ibid 384. 
221 Ibid 344 (emphasis added). 
222 Callinan J also stated that there are three categories of power to be kept in mind — exclusive 
Commonwealth power, concurrent Commonwealth and state power and exclusive state power: 
ibid 326. The claim that there is such a thing as exclusive state power might suggest that the 
exclusive powers of the states have a definite content. However, his Honour just as clearly 
accepted the distinction articulated by Isaacs J in Huddart Parker between ‘residual powers 
beyond Commonwealth power’ and ‘reserved powers’: at 369–70, citing Huddart Parker (1909) 
8 CLR 330, 394–6 (Isaacs J). To speak of residual powers beyond Commonwealth power is 
simply to draw an inference from the proposition that there are limits to the scope of federal 
power and that beyond those limits lie the residual powers of the states, a line of reasoning that 
is entirely consistent with an interpretive conception of federal balance and reserved powers. 
223 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 275–9. 
224 Ibid 279–84. 
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to a number of failed attempts to amend the Constitution to grant the Common-
wealth wider powers.225 
Callinan J next pointed out that, while the joint judgment acknowledged the 
need to read the Constitution as a whole, it was a negation of that principle to 
read each placitum of s 51 as broadly as the words used made possible.226 Noting 
the cases in which powers such as those over banking and acquisition had been 
read as limiting the scope of other powers,227 Callinan J pointed out that these 
are structurally similar to the industrial arbitration power in that they are all 
limited to matters that have some interstate aspect.228 If the banking and insur-
ance powers limit the scope of the corporations power, the industrial arbitration 
power might give rise to a similar ‘negative implication’.229 To speak of a 
negative implication is clearly reminiscent of reserved powers reasoning. 
However, the approach was ultimately interpretive, not absolutist — the negative 
implication was not treated as sufficient and had to be supported by a defensible 
interpretation of the language of the corporations power itself, read in light of its 
history, its context and the decided cases. In this respect, Callinan J read the 
convention debates and the opinions of early text writers as suggesting that the 
‘real purpose’ of s 51(xx) was to ‘ensure uniformity of status of corporations 
throughout Australia, rather than to appropriate State control over them.’230 
Inter-provisionally viewed, the necessity for a specific power over corporate 
insolvency in s 51(xvii) supported a correspondingly limited reading of 
s 51(xx),231 and an analysis of the decided cases showed that no majority of the 
Court had previously held s 51(xx) to extend ‘to each and every aspect of a 
corporation, its activities and its employees.’232 
Like the other members of the Court,233 Callinan J concluded that, despite the 
possibility that the territories power might support at least some aspects of the 
Work Choices Act, the Act must be considered ‘at face value’ and ‘as an inte-
grated endeavour, intended to stand or fall in its entirety.’234 This meant that the 
simple question was whether the Act could be supported by the corporations 
power, and Callinan J’s conclusion was that it could not be.235 
 
225 Ibid 284–300. See the contrary view of the majority: at 99–101. 
226 Ibid 333–4.  
227 Ibid 336–41, discussing Constitution ss 51(ii), (iii), (xiii), (xiv), (xxxiv). 
228 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 338–41. At 339, Callinan J quotes Latham CJ in the 
Bank Nationalisation Case (1948) 76 CLR 1, 184–5: 
no single power should be construed in such a way as to give to the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment a universal power of legislation which would render absurd the assignment of particular 
carefully defined powers to that Parliament. Each provision of the Constitution should be re-
garded, not as operating independently, but as intended to be construed and applied in the light 
of other provisions of the Constitution. 
229 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 350. See also the discussion at 344. 
230 Ibid 353. 
231 Ibid 355–8. 
232 Ibid 358. Callinan J’s survey of cases follows: at 358–75. 
233 Ibid 155–9 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ), 196 (Kirby J). 
234 Ibid 238 (Kirby J). Callinan J agreed: at 383. 
235 Ibid 384–5. 
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D  Kirby J 
Among the members of the Court, Kirby J was in temperament the most likely 
to acknowledge the constitutional choices facing the Court. Thus, his Honour 
very openly acknowledged that questions of constitutional characterisation 
ultimately involve an ‘opinionative assessment’ on which ‘reasonable minds can 
differ.’236 Yet, like Callinan J, he found the entire Work Choices Act to be 
unconstitutional and he relied on much the same doctrinal propositions and 
reasoning strategy to do so. Kirby J also emphasised the conventional aspects of 
his position237 and contrasted them with the radical or revolutionary character of 
the Work Choices legislative scheme.238 Moreover, like Callinan J, he abjured all 
reliance upon the reserved powers doctrine.239 However, as an opponent of 
originalism, Kirby J could not appeal to the intentions or understandings of the 
Constitution’s framers for decisive guidance as Callinan J had done.240 Rather, 
he insisted that it is the ‘genius of our system’ that ‘perceptions of the meaning 
of the Constitution change over time’ and he rejected efforts to ‘confine the 
meaning of the constitutional text … [to] the expectations of the founders’ or to 
the reasoning found in previous cases.241 Indeed, on this point he cited the 
Engineers’ Case, not for its textual literalism but for the proposition that the 
Constitution needs to be interpreted in accordance with the needs of the present 
age.242 
How, then, could Kirby J come to the same conclusion as Callinan J, while 
avoiding Callinan J’s originalism?243 First, Kirby J affirmed in no uncertain 
terms the principle (which he traced back to the Engineers’ Case) that heads of 
federal legislative power are to be given ‘ample’ content without implied 
restrictions based on reserved powers reasoning.244 Secondly, however, he also 
maintained that federal powers are subject to limitations derived from ‘safe-
guards, restrictions or qualifications’, as well as ‘guarantees protecting identifi-
able persons or groups’, written into other heads of legislative power.245 And this 
last proposition, he said, was especially applicable in the Work Choices Case. 
 
236 Ibid 203. 
237 Ibid 198–9, 223, 226–7. The submissions of the plaintiffs were presented as being in accord with 
established precedents and approaches to interpretation as established in the Engineers’ Case, 
and certainly not premised on reserved powers reasoning. 
238 According to Kirby J, the ‘extremely wide’ reading of the corporations power proposed by the 
Commonwealth presented an ‘extraordinary zenith of the federal constitutional power’ and a 
‘radical change in constitutional doctrine’, with ‘profound consequences’ for the ‘residual’ 
powers of the states and a ‘dysfunctional’ outcome: see ibid 183, 192–3, 225. 
239 Ibid 198–9, 201. 
240 Ibid 215 (Kirby J). 
241 Ibid 189. 
242 Ibid 229, citing Ron McCallum, ‘The Australian Constitution and the Shaping of Our Federal 
and State Labour Laws’ (2005) 10 Deakin Law Review 460, 467–9. 
243 Kirby J went to some trouble to recount the long line of cases on the industrial arbitration power 
in which it had been assumed that the limitations written into that power meant that the Com-
monwealth could not legislate at large in the field of industrial relations: see Work Choices Case 
(2006) 229 CLR 1, 183–9. However, on his own principles these considerations could not be 
decisive. 
244 Ibid 243. 
245 Ibid. 
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For Kirby J, the Constitution must be read as an entire document246 and in light 
of its far-reaching federal character.247 
Reserved powers reasoning was, in a sense, even more prominent in the rea-
soning of Kirby J than it was in that of Callinan J. For Kirby J, the central issue 
of the case was whether the corporations power is ‘completely unchecked and 
plenary, and disjoined from other powers’, or ‘subject to restrictions suggested 
by other paragraphs of s 51’.248 While Callinan J placed a great deal of emphasis 
upon the idea of maintaining the federal balance, Kirby J spent a significant 
proportion of his judgment discussing the limitations written into s 51(xxxv) and 
the cases in which the scope of federal heads of power had been limited by 
safeguards, restrictions or qualifications expressed in other heads of power.249 
Early in his judgment, Kirby J maintained that the language of s 51(xxxv) 
contained ‘two essential safeguards, restrictions or qualifications’ upon the 
exercise of federal power in the field of industrial relations. The first of these 
safeguards was the requirement of what he called ‘interstateness’: that the power 
depends upon the existence of a dispute that extends beyond the limits of any 
one state.250 The second was the requirement of ‘independent resolution’, 
meaning that the Parliament cannot legislate ‘generically and directly’, but must 
provide for the resolution of the dispute by an ‘independent conciliator or 
arbitrator’.251 According to Kirby J, the interstateness requirement preserves the 
federal character of the Constitution in the field of industrial relations in order to 
encourage diversity and experimentation in law-making and intergovernmental 
cooperation, while the independent resolution requirement encourages the 
resolution of disputes by agreement and the maintenance of principles of 
‘economic fairness’ to both employers and employees.252 However, a ‘national’ 
industrial relations regime founded predominantly upon the conception of 
corporations as employers would undo not only the prospects for jurisdictional 
experimentation and cooperation, but also for a balanced approach to the rights 
of both employers and employees.253 Indeed, the idea of industrial fairness or ‘a 
fair go all round’254 was effectively elevated in Kirby J’s judgment to the status 
of a constitutional imperative, comparable to other fundamental guarantees 
contained in the Constitution.255 In other words, the ultimate ground of Kirby J’s 
decision appears to have been the desirability of this state of affairs. Considera-
tions of what he called ‘legal principle and legal policy’,256 rather than the 
 
246 Ibid 201. 
247 Ibid 244–5. 
248 Ibid 193–4. See also at 201–2, 205–8. 
249 Ibid 207–22. 
250 Ibid 184. 
251 Ibid 185. See also at 244. 
252 Ibid 190. 
253 Ibid, citing McCallum, above n 242. 
254 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 244, quoting Blackadder v Ramsey Butchering Services 
Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 539, 549 (Kirby J). 
255 His Honour pointed out that just as the Court has been ‘rightly’ vigilant to defend the rights of 
property owners under s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, it ought also to be vigilant in defending 
the rights of employees under s 51(xxxv): Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 222. 
256 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 190. 
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requirements of the text or the expectations of the framers, appear to have been 
decisive.257 However, in order to reach this conclusion it was necessary for him 
to suggest that s 51(xx) is subject to certain ‘restrictions or limitations’ contained 
in s 51(xxxv), even though such reasoning looked very much like reserved 
powers reasoning. 
By focusing upon the industrial arbitration power as a kind of constitutional 
guarantee that provides exceptions to the scope of federal power, it was possible 
for Kirby J to strike down the Work Choices Act as unsupported by the corpora-
tions power, while affirming the otherwise extensive scope, not only of the 
corporations power, but also of other important federal powers such as the 
external affairs power.258 That Kirby J, like Callinan J, understood this primarily 
in interpretive rather than absolute terms is evident in his observation that on his 
reasoning s 51(xx) ‘takes on a reduced scope from what it otherwise might have 
had if para (xxxv) had not appeared in the Constitution at all’.259 This is reserved 
powers reasoning insofar as — like the reserved powers cases of the past — it 
cuts down the scope of one head of power by reference to the limited grant of 
power in another. Furthermore, it is an interpretive version of reserved powers 
reasoning insofar as it acknowledges that each head of power is capable of 
different constructions and that an interpretive choice has to be made. 
VI  CONCLUSIONS 
What exactly is wrong, then, with reserved powers reasoning? When presented 
in its abridged form, the doctrine seems at least obscure, if not also confused, 
illogical and illegitimate. And when cast in absolute terms, the doctrine appears 
to affirm the consequent by presupposing an extra-constitutional body of powers 
supposedly reserved to the states and then using this to limit the scope of the 
legislative powers explicitly conferred upon the Commonwealth. However, when 
understood and applied in interpretive terms, the reserved powers doctrine is 
founded upon a clear and defensible account of the political origins, underlying 
ideas, structural features and intended purposes of the Constitution; it entails a 
carefully articulated account of the grounds upon which the specific content of 
the powers reserved to the states can be identified; and it involves a sophisticated 
recognition that constitutional interpretation inevitably requires choices to be 
made. Indeed, when understood in interpretive terms, it might be doubted 
whether the label ‘reserved powers’ is entirely apposite. Behind the label is a 
method of reasoning that attends closely to the text and structure of the Constitu-
tion, reads the document as an integrated whole and pays close attention to its 
underlying principles and overarching purposes. 
 
257 But see ibid 194, where Kirby J refers to ‘history, experience and authority’, to ‘textual 
foundation[s]’, to the ‘structure’ and ‘federal character’ of the Constitution and to its ‘overall 
expression and design’. 
258 Kirby J made sure to acknowledge the expansive judicial interpretation that the corporations 
power had received over the years, beginning with the Concrete Pipes Case: see Work Choices 
Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 205. 
259 Work Choices Case (2006) 229 CLR 1, 205. 
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In the Work Choices Case, the High Court was presented with a set of interpre-
tive choices focusing upon the construction to be given to the corporations 
power, but also concerned with the construction to be given to many other 
aspects of the Constitution, including the limited terms in which the industrial 
arbitration power is framed. The majority presented their reasoning as if it rested 
entirely on the text of the Constitution and the decided cases, proceeding as if no 
significant interpretive choices were being made. On the other hand, the dissent-
ing justices acknowledged those choices and appealed to the framers, to federal-
ism and to various underlying values and principles for requisite guidance. 
However, the positions of the majority and the minority cannot simply be 
reduced to a textual literalism on one hand and an extra-textual originalism or 
purposive method of interpretation on the other. The assumptions of the ap-
proach in the Engineers’ Case relate not simply to the methodological proposi-
tion that the content of powers reserved to the states can only be ascertained after 
fully ascertaining the explicit powers conferred on the Commonwealth. These 
assumptions also relate to a deeper conception of the configuration of state and 
Commonwealth power along the lines of the testamentary analogy first proposed 
by Isaacs J, which casts the Imperial Parliament as testator, the Commonwealth 
as a specific beneficiary and the states as residuary beneficiaries. While the legal 
force of the Constitution, at least in 1901 and perhaps until 1986, may be traced 
back to the Imperial Parliament, the terms, structure, underlying principles and 
overarching purposes of the Constitution were determined by elected representa-
tives of the Australian colonies, who understood their task as one of conferring 
only limited powers upon the Commonwealth and reserving the balance to the 
states. In this light, the terms, structure, underlying principles and overarching 
purposes of the Constitution provide good reason to construe federal heads of 
power so as to take into consideration the powers and capacities that will be left 
to the states. Kirby and Callinan JJ, in dissent, sought to do precisely this. They 
understood the interpretive choices presented by the case and they chose to 
interpret the corporations power in a way that took into account the fact that the 
Australian Constitution is the constitution of a federal commonwealth.260 
 
260 See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12, preamble, s 3.  
